

Introduction

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In the last few years interest in a multi-faceted approach to Socrates and the Socratics has grown considerably. Not only have the *Sōkratikoī logoi* been studied with more and more attention; the historical and literary contexts to which the protagonists of these *logoi* belong have also been tackled extensively. The need to consider Socrates within a broader context has become urgent, this being the only way to understand both his uniqueness and the various – and often as yet unclear – relations which link him to the Athenian world and society of the second half of the fifth century B.C. A valuable survey of recent scholarship, entitled ‘*Socratic*’ *Dialogues*, appeared in 2009 in the electronic journal *Plato*, with contributions by Mauro Bonazzi, Louis-André Dorion, Noburu Notomi, Marcel van Ackeren, and Tomoko Hatano¹. This survey is mainly focused on Plato; the present one dwells on a wider range of topics, and encompasses studies of the other Socratics as well.

As reported extensively in the Introduction to *Socratica 2005*², the years between ca. 1960 and 1990 saw the publication of important editions of the

¹ M. Bonazzi *et al.*, “‘Socratic’ Dialogues”, *Plato. The Electronic Journal of the International Plato Society* 9 (2009): <http://gramata.univ-paris1.fr/Plato/article88.html>.

² L. Rossetti, “Introduzione”, in L. Rossetti–A. Stavru (eds.), *Socratica 2005. Studi sulla letteratura socratica antica presentati alle giornate di Studio di Senigallia*, Bari 2008, 11-36, esp. 11-13.

evidence available on Socrates and his disciples (especially on those who founded a school), culminating in Giannantoni's *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*³. Then came a period of rumination for about a decade, followed by new contributions, over the last ten years, which have reshaped the picture of the Socratics as a whole, making it necessary to reconsider the whole issue.

Of course, there is a rich past marking the route taken, and we need to acknowledge that as early as 1895 Rudolf Hirzel had written a remarkable book on the literary genre of the dialogue, which showed how the genesis of Socratic literature should be observed from as broad a perspective as possible⁴. Hirzel's way of conceiving a unique epoch in Greek literature and philosophy has been widely neglected in twentieth-century scholarship, which focused mainly on the question of the so-called 'historical Socrates'. This approach brought about important results⁵, but led eventually to the sceptical position formulated by Olof Gigon in 1947⁶. His radicalisation of the 'Socratic question', according to which every surviving testimony on Socrates should be considered as literary fiction, and therefore untrustworthy, profoundly influenced contemporary 'continental' scholarship⁷. In the second half of the last century the most influential German, French, and Italian scholars ceased dealing with the historical, and in some cases even the philosophical, figure of Socrates. The approach to the 'Socratic problem' became mainly philological, as scholars attempted to refashion the surviving frag-

³ G. Giannantoni (ed.), *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, Napoli 1990 (4 vols.).

⁴ R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog. Ein literarhistorischer Versuch*, Leipzig 1895. Attention to this book has been drawn recently by M. Narcy, "Che cosa è un dialogo socratico?", in G. Mazzara (ed.), *Il Socrate dei dialoghi*, Bari 2007, 21-32.

⁵ The most representative of which are the books by H. Maier (*Sokrates. Sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung*, Tübingen 1913) and V. de Magalhães-Vilhena (*Le problème de Socrate. Le Socrate historique et le Socrate de Platon*, and *Socrate et la légende Platonicienne*; both Paris 1952).

⁶ O. Gigon, *Sokrates. Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte*, Bern 1947.

⁷ L. Rossetti, *Aspetti della letteratura socratica antica*, Chieti 1977; A. Patzer (ed.), *Der historische Sokrates*, Darmstadt 1987; M. Montuori (ed.), *The Socratic Problem. The History — The Solutions*, Amsterdam 1992. However, this scepticism did not affect the most influential English-speaking scholarship, which never abandoned the hope of reconstructing a 'historical' Socrates: see esp. W.K.C. Guthrie (*History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. III and *Socrates*, Cambridge 1969 and 1971 respectively); and G. Vlastos (*Socrates. Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Ithaca NY 1991).

ments of ancient testimonies on Socrates into their original wholeness⁸.

What this approach omitted – or deliberately sidestepped – was the possibility of going beyond the mere *classification* of Socratic literature into sub-genres (i.e. into ‘minor’ or ‘minimal’ Socratics, or those who founded and led schools and those who did not)⁹ and tackling the theoretical value of these writings. The difficulty of this task lies in a series of age-old prejudices concerning the philosophical capabilities of the Socratics (i.e. Xenophon, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Aristippus, Phaedo and Euclides, to name only the most significant ones), which has led a number of modern and contemporary scholars to consider Plato the only reliable source for reconstructing the thought of Socrates¹⁰. But how old are these prejudices? Where do they come from? And, most important, are they in any way legitimate?

First of all, we should bear in mind that the non-Platonic Socrates, especially that of Xenophon, enjoyed a high reputation in Western culture. Recent proceedings of conferences held in Lecce, Ioannina (2001) and London (2002) have shown how the popularity of a mainly Xenophontic *exemplum Socratis* extended from the Hellenistic to the Modern Age¹¹, up to the time of at least Friedrich Nietzsche’s and Antonio Labriola’s¹² portraits of the philo-

⁸ The final result of this way of handling the Socratic problem are the above mentioned *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae* edited by Giannantoni (see above, n. 3).

⁹ A wish expressed by G. Romeyer-Dherbey, in the “Préface” to G. Romeyer Dherbey (dir.), J.-B. Gourinat (éd.), *Socrate et les Socratiques*, Paris 2001, ix and xi.

¹⁰ Such a way of dealing the ‘Socratic problem’ is deeply rooted in modern scholarship since F.E.D. Schleiermacher’s famous speech “Über den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen” (held on July 7, 1815; published in *Abhandlungen der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* 1818, 50-68). The most influent contemporary scholar maintaining the view of a solely Platonic Socrates is Charles Kahn (*Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*, Cambridge 1996, 87): «I conclude that neither Aristotle nor Xenophon is in a position to tell us anything about the philosophy of Socrates that he has not learned from Plato’s dialogues. Aristotle is unable to do so because he arrived on the scene too late; he was separated from Socrates by the dazzling screen of Plato’s portrayal. Xenophon is unable because he has no personal understanding of philosophy at all».

¹¹ See respectively E. Lojacono (ed.), *Socrate in Occidente*, Firenze 2004; C.A. Tezas (ed.), *Dynotita kai horia tis gnosis kata ton Sokrati*, Ioannina 2004; M. Trapp (ed.), *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment and Socrates in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (both London 2007).

¹² For Labriola’s Socrates see E. Spinelli, “La parabola del Socrate senofonteo: da Labriola a Mondolfo”, in L. Rossetti–A. Stavru (eds.), *Socratica 2005*, cit., 107-135.

sopher. The fortune of this paradigm has been confirmed by other conferences¹³ and articles on the reception¹⁴ of Socrates, an issue on which entire books have been published¹⁵.

As is widely known, the turning point in the Socratic question goes back

¹³ Much work on the reception of Socrates is being done by the German *Sokratische Gesellschaft*, which organizes meetings as well as conferences. The Proceedings are published in the *Sokrates-Studien*, of which six have already appeared: vols. I-V have been edited by H. Kessler, Kusterdingen 1993-2001; vol. VI by W. van der Weppen–B. Zimmermann, Tübingen 2006. The latter volume contains contributes on Socrates in Archelaus, Clemens Alexandrinus, the Middle Ages, European Art, 18th Century Paedagogy, Valéry, and Dürrenmatt.

¹⁴ Studies have been published on the reception of Socrates from Antiquity to Modern Age, i.e., in Aristotle (E. Berti, “Socrate e la scienza dei contrari secondo Aristotele”, *Elenchos* 29, 2008, 303-315; J. Mansfeld, “Aristotle on Socrates’ Contributions to Philosophy”, in F. Alesse *et al.* eds., *Anthropine sophia*, Napoli 2008, 337-349), Porphyry (F. Ademollo, “Sophroniscus’ Son Is Approaching: Porphyry, *Isagoge* 7.20-1”, *Classical Quarterly* 54, 2004, 322-325), Pythagoreanism and Middle Platonism (P. Donini, “Socrate ‘pitagorico’ e medioplatonico”, *Elenchos* 24, 2003, 333-359), Plutarch (J. Warren, “Socratic Scepticism in Plutarch’s *Adversus Colotem*”, *Elenchos* 23, 2002, 333-356), Epictetus (A.A. Long, “Epictetus as Socratic Mentor”, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 46, 2000, 79-98), Apuleius (U. Schindel, “Apuleius – *Africanus Socrates*? Beobachtungen zu den Verteidigungsreden des Apuleius und des platonischen Sokrates”, *Hermes* 128, 2000, 443-456), Flavius Philostratus (M. Telò, “Sofocle, Socrate e gli ‘inganni’ della mimesi: Philostr. *Iun. Imag.* 13,3”, *Eikasmos* 16, 2005, 265-281), Giannozzo Manetti (J. Hankins, “Manetti’s Socrates and the Socrateses of Antiquity”, in S.U. Baldassarri ed., *In dignitas et excellentia hominis. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi su Giannozzo Manetti*, Firenze 2008, 203-219). For comprehensive surveys on the modern Socrateses see M. Raschini, *Interpretazioni socratiche*, Venezia 2000², and D. Evans, “Socrates through the Ages”, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 17 (2009), 185-190.

¹⁵ On the reception of Socrates in Diogenes Laertius, Libanius, Maximus of Tyre, and Apuleius see W.M. Calder III *et al.*, *The Unknown Socrates*, Wauconda IL 2002. R. Mugerauer, *Wider das Vergessen des sokratischen Nichtwissens*, Marburg 2007, dwells on the ‘progressive marginalisation’ of Plato’s Socrates in Plotinus, Eckhart, and the German *reformatorisches Schulwesen* of the 16th century. G. Schmidt, *Der platonische Sokrates*, Würzburg 2006, provides thoughtful essays on the Socrateses of Nietzsche (43-57), Hegel (129-141), and Heidegger (143-160). See also W. O. Kohan, *Sócrates: el enigma de enseñar*, Buenos Aires 2009, where the portrayals of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Rancière and Foucault are discussed in detail. F. Filippi, *Socrate nell’età dell’ermeneutica*, Milano 2003, and P. Warnek, *Descent of Socrates: Self-Knowledge and Cryptic Nature in the Platonic Dialogues*, Bloomington–Indianapolis IN 2005, are interesting attempts to understand core issues of the Platonic Socrates from the viewpoint of contemporary hermeneutic philosophy.

to the romantic-period philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher¹⁶. After his speech of 1815, modern scholarship started taking Plato as the only reliable source for Socrates, thus gradually excluding from the picture not only Xenophon but the non-Platonic *Sōkratikoī logoi* as a whole¹⁷. This radical focus on Plato reached its climax in the writings of the two representatives of the ‘Scottish School’, John Burnet and Alfred Edward Taylor¹⁸. Their works exerted a great influence on Twentieth Century scholarship, in continental Europe as well as in the English-speaking countries. Right up to the present, in fact: the main works of the numerous ‘heirs’ of Gregory Vlastos (who, by the way, did not completely dismiss the Socrateses of Xenophon and Aristotle), as well as those of most of his opponents, are once again strongly focused on Plato’s Socrates¹⁹. This does not mean that the issue of the Socratics and their *logoi* has been completely cast aside, as the books by Charles Kahn and Debra Nails have shown. Nevertheless, even if in these and other interpretations the Socratics play an important part, their intellectual value has not yet been acknowledged²⁰.

¹⁶ See L.-A. Dorion, “A l’origine de la question socratique et de la critique du témoignage de Xénophon: l’étude de Schleiermacher sur Socrate (1815)”, *Dionysius* 19 (2001), 51-74 and Id., “Xenophon’s Socrates”, in S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, Malden MA 2006, 93-109. Schleiermacher’s work is cited above, n. 10.

¹⁷ So, if Hegel’s Socrates is balancing the different testimonies of Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle (esp. in his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1833), in Kierkegaard we can already observe a mainly Platonic Socrates (esp. *Om Begrebet Ironi med standigt Hensyn til Socrates*, 1841).

¹⁸ See J. Burnet (ed.), *Plato’s Phaedo*, Oxford 1911; “The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 7 (1915-1916), 235-259; “Socrates”, in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, in J. Hastings (ed.), vol. XII, Edinburgh 1920, 665-672; *Greek Philosophy*, vol. I: *From Thales to Plato*, London, 1920; *Platonism*, Berkeley CA 1928. For Taylor see *Varia Socratica. First Series*, Oxford 1911; “*Varia Socratica* Once More”, *Classical Philology* 7 (1912), 85-89; “Plato’s Biography of Socrates”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* (1917-1918), 93-132; *Socrates*, Edinburgh 1933.

¹⁹ Paradigmatic is in this respect the title of a book by T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith: *Plato’s Socrates*, New York–Oxford 1994.

²⁰ For Kahn see above, n. 10. Debra Nails, who wrote an excellent book on *The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics* (Indianapolis 2002), sees in Xenophon «a practical man whose ability to recognize philosophical issues is almost imperceptible», and believes «that Plato’s Socrates is the Socrates who is relevant to potential progress in philosophy» (“Socrates”, in N. Zalta ed., *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, rev. ed. Sat Nov 7, 2009², <http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/socrates/>).

The major problem in underestimating – or even dismissing – testimonies other than Plato’s can be summarized as follows. When Plato started writing dialogues, presumably shortly after 399 B.C.²¹, his elder companions such as Antisthenes or Aeschines enjoyed a far higher status than he did²². Fifty years later, in 350, the situation had completely changed, as the superiority of Plato – of his writings as well as of his school – was an undisputed fact. To explain such an abrupt change it is necessary to suppose that a process took place in which Plato gradually established himself as the leading Socratic. In this period of time his ideas came to challenge those of his companions, leading to a powerful philosophical struggle among them, of which the testimonies of the *logoi* offer only a glimpse. Understanding Plato’s ideas means therefore dwelling on the *context* in which they developed and eventually emerged as the most prominent. In other words, a closer look at the theoretical issues of the ‘minor’ Socratics is necessary for a true and full acknowledgement of Plato’s superiority. For such a superiority can be fully appreciated only if Plato’s antagonists *are also acknowledged in their full philosophical stature*.

A proper study of the *context* in which Plato wrote is thus likely to tell us a good deal about Plato himself, both influencing and enriching our way of looking at the philosophical issues he engaged with²³. Re-thinking the rela-

²¹ This is the current opinion of contemporary scholarship. An exception is Ernst Heitsch, who maintains that Plato wrote the *Hippias Minor* and the *Ion* before the death of Socrates. See E. Heitsch, “Hat Sokrates Dialoge Platons noch lesen können?“, *Gymnasium* 110 (2003), 109-119; “Dialoge Platons vor 399 v. Chr.?” (2002) in Id., *Platon. Apologie des Sokrates*, transl. and comm. by E. Heitsch, Göttingen 2004², 181-189; *Platon und die Anfänge seines dialektischen Philosophierens*, Göttingen 2004. Contra Heitsch, see the arguments of F.M. Giuliano, *Platone e la poesia*, Sankt Augustin 2005, and D. Frede, “Socrates and Plato”, *Phronesis* 51 (2006), 94-95.

²² For this issue see the essay by Aldo Brancacci in this volume.

²³ More about these issues in L. Rossetti, “Le dialogue socratique *in statu nascendi*”, *Philosophie Antique* 1 (2001), 11-35; “La nascita di un nuovo genere letterario all’inizio del IV secolo a.C.: il *logos Sokratikos*”, *Classica Cracoviensa* 6 (2001), 187-202; “Socrate e il dialogo ‘ad alta interattività’”, *Humanitas* 53 (2001), 171-181; “The *Sōkratikoī Logoi* as a Literary Barrier. Toward the Identification of a Standard Socrates Through Them”, in V. Karasmanis, *Socrates 2400 Years Since His Death (399 BC-2001 AD)*, Athina 2004, 81-94; “*Logoi Sōkratikoī*. Le contexte littéraire dans lequel Platon a écrit”, in M. Fattal (ed.), *La philosophie de Platon*, t. 2, Paris 2005, 51-80; “A Holistic Approach to the Earlier Socratic Literature”, *Zbornik srpske matice sa klasične studije* 7 (2005), 7-13; “A Context for Plato’s

tions between him and his companions from the holistic viewpoint of the *Sōkratikoí logoi* has been the objective of *Socratica* conferences which took place in Senigallia (2005) and Naples (2008). These successful events will hopefully be repeated in 2011²⁴, as part of an attempt to establish a *forum* parallel to that of the *Symposia Platonica*. The importance of regular meetings on this topic is confirmed by a series of recent publications, all of which show how interest in the milieu of Socrates and the Socratics is gaining more and more ground²⁵.

Comprehensive collective volumes, partly arising from conferences, offer a picture of Socrates in context. Such is the case of the book edited by Vassilis Karasmanis, which collected together the papers of the international conference held in Delphi 2001 to celebrate the 2400 years since the death of Socrates²⁶. A multi-faceted Socrates emerges here, i.e. that of Comedy (Brown), of Xenophon (Natali, Seel, Dorion), of Plato (Gómez-Lobo, Bossi, Reeve, Robinson, Kahn, Mc Kirahan, Rowe, Parry, Penner, Samaras, Brown, Balla, Hatzistavrou, Herrmann, Gallop, Brouwer/Polanski, Crivelli, Matthews, Judson, Calvo, Kuçuradi, Scaltsas, Erler, Politis, Tsouna, Patterson, Schiaparelli, Karasmanis, Charles, Tselemanis, Irwin, Mason), in connection with the Sophists (Pentzopoulou-Valatas, Taylor, Calligas), from the viewpoint of Euripides (Alesse), of the *logoi Sōkratikoí* as a whole (Rossetti), of the Cyrenaics (Fine, Hülsz), of the Sceptic Academy (Cooper, Glucker), of Colotes (Warren), of the Stoics (Dragona, Long, Ierodiakonou),

Dialogues”, in A. Bosch-Veciana–J. Montserrat-Molas (eds.), *Philosophy and Dialogue. Studies on Plato’s Dialogues (I)*, Barcelona 2007, 15-31; “Il dialogo socratico come unità comunicazionale ‘aperta’”, in G. Mazzara (ed.), *Il Socrate dei dialoghi*, cit., 33-52; “Introduzione” and “I Socratici della prima generazione: fare filosofia con i dialoghi anziché con trattati o testi paradossali”, in L. Rossetti–A. Stavru (eds.), *Socratica 2005*, cit., 11-36 and 39-75 respectively. See as well the essay contained in this volume.

²⁴ Further information on the *Socratica* meetings on <http://www.socratica.eu/>.

²⁵ See M. Vegetti, “La letteratura socratica e la competizione fra generi letterari”, in F. Roscalla (ed.), *L’autore e l’opera*, Pisa 2007, 119-131; D. Wolfsdorf, “Hesiod, Prodicus, and the Socratics on Work and Pleasure”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 35 (2008), 1-18; C. Horn–J. Müller–J. Söder, ‘Sokrates’, in *Platon-Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung*, Stuttgart–Weimar 2009, 80-83; M. Bonazzi *et al.*, “‘Socratic’ Dialogues”, cit.

²⁶ V. Karasmanis (ed.), *Socrates 2400 Years Since His Death*, cit. A selection of papers from this volume appeared two years later: L. Judson–V. Karasmanis (eds.), *Remembering Socrates. Philosophical Essays*, Oxford 2006.

of the Neoplatonists (Smith, Perdikouri, Rangos), of the early Christians (Frede), of ancient and modern Art (Trapp), and of the Italian Renaissance (Hankins).

A similar approach characterizes the *Companion to Socrates* edited by Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar in 2006²⁷, which has contributions on Antisthenes (Prince), Plato (Nails, Woodruff, Rowe, Segvic, Rudebusch, Kamtekar, Kraut, Weiss, Tarrant), Xenophon (Dorion), the trial (Nails, Janko), the *daimonion* and religion (Long, Bussanich), the physiognomy (Lapatin), Euripides (Wildberg), the Stoa (Brown, Brennan), Skepticism (Bett), Arabic Philosophy (Alon), Italian Renaissance (Jenkins), Early Modern France (McLean), Hegel (White), Kierkegaard (Muench), Nietzsche (Porter), Heidegger and Gadamer (González), Psychoanalysis (Lear), Lacan (Buchan), Pedagogical Practice (Mintz), and the History of Philosophy (Ausland).

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A very important piece in the Socratic puzzle is Aristophanes. His testimony is on the one hand invaluable because he was a contemporary of Socrates, on the other hand very tricky and difficult to evaluate. Studies dealing with it are therefore particularly welcome, irrespective of whether their approach is philological or philosophical. General works on Aristophanes have appeared recently²⁸ as well as studies devoted to the *Clouds*²⁹. A very interesting article is that of Hartmut Erbse, who substantially revises his article of 1954 and examines the secondary literature that has appeared since then³⁰. Important studies deal with the dramaturgic context in which the *Clouds* were produced in 423, as well as with its resounding lack of success

²⁷ S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit.

²⁸ P. von Möllendorff, *Aristophanes*, Hildesheim 2002; N.G. Wilson, *Aristophanes. Studies on the Text of Aristophanes*, Oxford 2007 (62-80 is a textual comment on the *Clouds*, 163-184 on the *Frogs*).

²⁹ S. Tzivilis, “A propósito de la representación de *Las Nubes* (vv. 886-1149)”, *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica. Estudios Griegos e Indoeuropeos* 10 (2000), 91-104; P. Brown, “Socrates in Comedy”, V. Karasmanis (ed.), *Socrates 2400 Years Since His Death*, cit., 525-534, and “The Comic Socrates”, in M. Trapp (ed.), *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, cit., 1-16.

³⁰ H. Erbse, “Zur Interpretation der *Wolken* des Aristophanes”, *Hermes* 130 (2002), 381-388.

(which led Aristophanes to re-write this comedy some years later)³¹. John Whitehorne examines Aristophanes' attacks on Socrates, Euripides, and Agathon³²; Andreas Heil discusses the relationship between Socrates and Euripides in the *Frogs*, maintaining that the *mēd'akōn* of line 1523 could be related to the *oudeis hekōn adikei* of Plato's *Protagoras* (e.g. 345e)³³. Other issues tackled in secondary literature are the different ways Socrates and the Socratics are called in the *Clouds*, the most important of which turn out to be *blepedaimones*³⁴ and *phrontistai*³⁵. Moreover, topics possibly connecting Aristophanes with Plato are those of 'irony' and 'separate forms', both examined in contributions which have appeared recently in *The Classical Quarterly*³⁶.

Analyzing Socrates' life and thought before 399 B.C., thus *independently of Socratic literature*, is a difficult task. Studies undertaking such an enterprise have the privileged feature of shedding light on unexplored territory. Such are the works dealing with Socrates' interest in natural science (as described in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and in Plato's *Phaedo*). An article by Richard Janko shows possible contact points between the scientific issues

³¹ D. Harvey-J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes: Studies in Athenian Old Comedy*, with a foreword by K. Dover, London 2000; I. Ruffell, "A Total Write-Off. Aristophanes, Cratinus, and the Rhetoric of Comic Competition", *Classical Quarterly* 52 (2002), 138-162; I.C. Storey, *Eupolis, Poet of Old Comedy*, Oxford 2003; E. Dettori, "Appunti sul *Banchetto di Pollis* (Call. Fr. 178 Pf.)", in R. Pretagostini-E. Dettori (eds.), *La cultura ellenistica: l'opera letteraria e l'esegesi antica*, Roma 2004, 57-58; N. Kyriakidi, *Aristophanes und Eupolis*, Berlin 2007.

³² J. Whitehorne, "Aristophanes' Representations of 'Intellectuals'", *Hermes* 130 (2002), 28-35.

³³ A. Heil, "Sokratisches in den *Fröschen* des Aristophanes", *Hermes* 128 (2000), 503-505.

³⁴ E. Kerr Borthwick, "Socrates, Socratics, and the Word *Βλεπεδαίμων*", *Classical Quarterly* 51 (2001), 297-301.

³⁵ L. Edmunds, "What Was Socrates Called?", *Classical Quarterly* 56 (2006), 414-425. From the same author see as well "Socrates and the Sophists in Old Comedy: A Single Type?", *Dioniso* (forthcoming). On Aristophanes as a source of the Socratics see R. Wallace, "Plato's Sophists, Intellectual History after 450, and Sokrates", in L.J. Samons II (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Athens in the Age of Pericles*, Cambridge, 2007, 215-237.

³⁶ See respectively D. Wolfsdorf, "Ἐίρωνεία in Aristophanes and Plato", *Classical Quarterly* 58 (2008), 666-672, and J. Broackes, "Ἀὐτὸς καθ' αὐτόν in the *Clouds*: Was Socrates Himself a Defender of Separable Soul and Separate Forms?", *Classical Quarterly* 59 (2009), 46-59.

displayed in the Derveni papyrus (which following Yanko could be attributed to the poet and sophist Diagoras of Melos) and those attributed to Socrates in the *Clouds* (e.g. the divinity of Air). This hypothesis is based on *Cl.* 828 and 830, where Strepsiades talks about a ‘Socrates the Melian’ – a way of equating Socrates with Diagoras of Melos, who like him was condemned to death for impiety (in 415)³⁷. The new edition of the fragments of Diogenes of Apollonia by André Laks also deals with the problem of the ‘scientific’ period of Socrates³⁸. Laks dwells especially on the two teleological chapters of Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (I 4 and IV 3), showing how both Dümmler and Theiler were wrong in connecting them to a Diogenean influence on the ‘naturalist’ Socrates³⁹: «Diogenes did not bother himself with, or was not interested in, showing in what sense the world is organised in the best possible manner; this looked to him as something that happened as a matter of course. What did interest him, on the other hand, was to show what is that thing that exercised intelligence. From this point of view, the emphasis is definitely not on teleology, but rather on noetics»⁴⁰. As we shall see in the part of this survey dedicated to Xenophon, David Sedley has gone even further in the interpretation of these chapters of the *Memorabilia*. Agreeing with Laks that in Diogenes «no Panglossian teleology is being formulated»⁴¹, he remarks how these chapters are of utmost significance, as they bring about one of the «most widely recognized contributions to the history of science»⁴². Hence, according to Sedley, the ‘naturalist’ phase of Socrates, far from representing

³⁷ R. Janko, “God, Science and Socrates”, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 46 (2003), 1-18.

³⁸ A. Laks (ed.), *Diogène d’Apollonie*, Sankt Augustin 2008². See esp. 21-23 and 281-288 on the alleged influence of Diogenes and Archelaus on the Socrates of the *Clouds*.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 275-280, where Laks discusses critically the influential works by F. Dümmler, *Akademika*, Giessen 1889, and W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles*, Berlin 1965². See also 282: «Theiler’s famous interpretation (also meant to give some importance to Diogenes) made Diogenes the hidden (and for most part lost) source of Socrates’ panglossian teleology that features in two chapters of Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*... readers of Xenophon have developed more plausible views about Socrates’ teleology».

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 288.

⁴¹ D. Sedley, *Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity*, Berkeley CA 2007, 77.

⁴² D. Sedley, “Socrates’ Place in the History of Teleology”, *Elenchos* 29 (2008), 317-334; esp. 317.

a tentative segment of the philosopher's life, plays a «seminal role», competing «even with Aristotle for historical importance»⁴³.

More about the relations linking Socrates to the physiologists of his time can be found in a valuable article by Andreas Patzer, in which the famous testimony of Ion of Chios reported by Diogenes Laertius (II 23) is discussed in detail⁴⁴. In this 'non-fictional text' the traditional view of the stationary Socrates is contradicted, and a trip to Samos by a young Socrates, in the company of Archelaus of Athens, is attested⁴⁵. Whether this event should be interpreted in the sense that «the one was the student of the other», as Daniel Graham claims⁴⁶, is likely, but not certain. Very interesting but in need of further investigation are also Patzer's remarks about the pedagogic and erotic relation linking Socrates to Archelaus (as reported by Aristoxenus)⁴⁷.

Two contributions dealing with Socrates and Euripides add depth to the image of a Socrates seen from a viewpoint different from that of his companions. Francesca Alesse focuses on a great number of testimonies which portray common issues between the Socratics and Euripides, while Christian Wildberg points out the difficulty of ascertaining the standpoint of Euripides even in passages of his plays in which apparently 'Socratic' issues are discussed (i.e. *Hippol.* 380-383 and *Med.* 1078-1080)⁴⁸.

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⁴³ Ibid., 318. «Socrates marks a key moment in the history of teleology. His significance for that history lies in his introduction of ideas – about values, craft, intelligence and divinity – which were to become central to the teleology of Plato, and in due course to exercise a profound influence on Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen» (334).

⁴⁴ A. Patzer, «Sokrates und Archelaos. Historische und fiktionale Texte über den jungen Sokrates», in W. van der Weppen–B. Zimmermann (eds.), *Sokrates im Gang der Zeiten*, cit., 11-56. See as well R. Fletcher, «Legwork: Ion's Socrates», in V. Jennings–A. Katsaros (eds.), *The World of Ion of Chios*, Leiden–Boston MA 2007, 319-330.

⁴⁵ A. Patzer, *Sokrates und Archelaos*, cit., 15: «Nicht fiktional, sondern *sensu strictu* historisch ist indes die Reise des Sokrates nach Samos, deren Kenntnis wir Ion von Chios (fr. 11 Bl.) verdanken».

⁴⁶ D. Graham, «Socrates on Samos», *Classical Quarterly* 58 (2008), 308-313.

⁴⁷ A. Patzer, «Sokrates und Archelaos», cit., 36-50.

⁴⁸ F. Alesse, «Euripides and the Socratics», in V. Karasmanis (ed.), *Socrates 2400 Years Since His Death*, cit., 371-381; C. Wildberg, «Socrates and Euripides», in S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit., 21-35. On Diogenes Laertius' account of the relationship between Socrates and Euripides see the article by Michel Narcy in this volume.

A remarkable contribution to recent scholarship comes from the French psychoanalyst François Roustang. In his new book⁴⁹ he gives an account of an eccentric Socrates which contrasts with what we know from the main testimonies (Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle), all of them putting a ‘label’ on ‘their’ Socrates. According to Roustang, the labels which Plato and other testimonies attach to the teachings of Socrates prove not particularly enlightening; but their portrayals of Socrates ‘at work’ do have the advantage of allowing the hidden features of his personality to surface, and are able to offer us a vivid and credible idea of what sort of man he might have been. In other words, these portrayals reveal things which remain outside of the explicit characterizations of the philosopher by the same authors (e.g. towards the end of Plato’s *Phaedo*, where he is said to have been *phronimotatos kai dikaiotatos*), and are therefore very precious means for understanding his ‘strangeness’. Such a focus on Socrates’ *atopia* seems very promising, and opens up a new avenue for research on Socratic literature as a whole. The book by Roustang is therefore not only about Socrates, but also about the *Sōkratikoï logoi*, a field of research which in the period we are considering has been enriched by a number of stimulating works.

Particularly interesting are the articles published on one of the most influential of the Socratics, Antisthenes⁵⁰. Aldo Brancacci, who wrote a monograph on this seminal figure twenty years ago⁵¹, has never stopped working on him. In an article which appeared in 2002⁵², he goes back to the main issue tackled in his book of 1990, the *oikeios logos*. His essay of 2003, by contrast, is devoted to a new topic, that of the two lost writings *Peri tōn en Aidou* (or *Kyrzas*) and *Peri tou apothanein*⁵³. As Brancacci shows in detail,

⁴⁹ F. Roustang, *Le secret de Socrate pour changer la vie*, Paris 2009.

⁵⁰ For general views on Antisthenes see the essay by A. Brancacci in this volume or S. Prince, “Socrates, Antisthenes, and the Cynics”, in S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit., 75-92, in which the basic biographical and intellectual facts are sketched (Antisthenes as the forefather of Cynicism, his privileged relation to Socrates, and his theories on language, ethics, and becoming wise).

⁵¹ A. Brancacci, *Oikeios logos. La filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene*, Napoli 1990 (of which a French translation appeared in 2005: *Antisthène. Le discours propre*, Paris).

⁵² A. Brancacci, “La determinazione dell’*eidōs* nel *Menone*”, *Wiener Studien* 115 (2002), 59-78.

⁵³ A. Brancacci, “Zwei verlorene Schriften des Antisthenes”, *Rheinisches Museum* 146 (2003), 259-278.

their content reminds us of Plato's depictions of his master's death in the *Apology* and the *Phaedo*: «Antisthenes' work *Peri tou apothanein* seems to have the same relation to the *Peri tōn en Aidou* as in Plato the *Apology* has to the *Phaedo*»⁵⁴. This brings us back to the 'philosophical struggle' among the Socratics mentioned above: writings in which Plato's theory of ideas is heavily criticized, such as Antisthenes' *Sathōn* (ca. 384), can be properly understood only within the context of a strong competition between philosophical schools which took place in the years following the master's death⁵⁵. Another distinctive issue emerging from Antisthenes' fragments is rhetoric, a topic closely linked to Odysseus' paradigmatic *polytropa*. Two works deal with it, showing its importance for the Socratics as a whole (esp. for Xenophon)⁵⁶.

The knowledge we have of another founder of a Socratic school, Phaedo of Elis, is also very fragmentary. Interesting testimonies remain of one of his two dialogues, the *Zopyrus*. Recent studies following the book by Paul Zanker⁵⁷ have shown how they can be related to a major feature of Socrates' outward appearance, that is, his 'strange' physiognomy. On this issue work is in progress: important pieces of research are developing in Warwick under the general editorship of Simon Swain⁵⁸, and in Hamilton (Ontario), where Daniel McLean continues with a study he began a decade ago in Pennsylvania⁵⁹. These broad approaches to the *Zopyrus* anecdote are particularly interesting, as they give a picture of its influence throughout Western

⁵⁴ Ibid., 272.

⁵⁵ See M. Rashed, "Platon, Sathon, Phedon", *Elenchos* 27 (2006), 117-122.

⁵⁶ See L. Lampert, "Socrates' Defence of Polytopic Odysseus: Lying and Wrongdoing in Plato's *Lesser Hippias*", *Review of Politics* 64 (2002), 231-259, and D. LévyStone, "La figure d'Ulysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate *polutropos*", *Phronesis* 50 (2005), 181-214.

⁵⁷ P. Zanker, *Die Maske des Sokrates. Das Bild des Intellektuellen in der antiken Kunst*, München 1995.

⁵⁸ The title of this big research project is *Physiognomy: an Interdisciplinary Study from Graeco-Roman Antiquity to Islam* (see http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/classics/research/dept_projects/). First results of it have been evaluated by G. Boys-Stones, "Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the Soul", *Phronesis* 49 (2004), 1-23.

⁵⁹ An abstract of McLean's unpublished PhD dissertation (*Refiguring Socrates: Comedy and Corporeality in the Socratic Tradition*) is available under <http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3043914>. More recently, see Id., "The Socratic Corpus: Socrates and Physiognomy", in M. Trapp (ed.), *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, cit., 65-88.

culture. It plays a seminal role, for example, even in Nietzsche's image of Socrates, as was shown in a recently republished essay by Gerhart Schmidt⁶⁰.

A neglected source for Socrates is Euclides of Megara, on whom very little work has been done in the last years. Particularly welcome therefore is Aldo Brancacci's article on Euclides' double *daimōn*⁶¹, a notion which can be reconstructed through the testimonies of Stobaeus (*Anth.* III 6.63) and Censorinus (*De die nat.* 3.3). According to these authors, Euclides maintained (1) that Sleep and Death are the two *daimones* which present themselves to men unavoidably (Stobaeus); and (2) that every man, without distinction, has been assigned a double *daimōn* (Censorinus). Rejecting both Zeller's and Boyancé's interpretations of these testimonies, Brancacci shows their importance for a correct understanding of Plato's and Xenophon's relevant passages on the *daimonion*. First of all, it should be noticed that Plato and Xenophon do not always imply the notion of a single *daimonion*: in Plat. *Apol.* 27b-c: Socrates speaks of *daimones* in the plural, and in Xen. *Mem.* I 1-2 he reacts to the accusation of believing in *daimonia kaina*. Euclides' distinction between the two *daimones* sheds light on these passages, as well as on the section of Plato's *Apology* dealing with Socrates' two hypotheses of death: (a) as being nothing anymore and having no sensation, i.e. in sleep, 40c5-6; and (b) as a migration of the soul from this place to another place, 40c7-9. Secondly, Brancacci points out that «in Xenophon and Plato the *daimonion*... does not represent a concept (wisdom, for example, or good), but a function»⁶², and that the same applies to Euclides, whose «double *daimōn* can be, logically, none other than a double requirement or function ... once pushing people to act and ... on other occasions preventing them from doing so»⁶³. This account offers an explanation of the difference between Plato's *daimonion* (which only prevents one from doing something), and Xenophon's (which also positively recommends action): the double function of Euclides' *daimōn* «could have been ... a coherent way of reconciling the

⁶⁰ G. Schmidt, 'Nietzsche und Sokrates', in Id., *Der platonische Sokrates*, cit., 43-57; esp. 54-56.

⁶¹ A. Brancacci, "The Double *Daimōn* in Euclides the Socratic", in P. Destrée-N.D. Smith (eds.), *Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy*, in *Apeiron* 38 (2005), 143-154.

⁶² Ibid., 152.

⁶³ Ibid., 153.

tradition of the two personal *daimones* with the more advanced concept of the *daimōn*... maintained by Socrates and revived, in the Socratic sphere, by Antisthenes, Xenophon, and Plato»⁶⁴.

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The next re-discovered Socratic who needed to be talked about is Xenophon. The studies dealing with his different portrayals of Socrates have experienced a genuine renaissance in the last decade, spawning a vast amount of literature⁶⁵. Recent editions and re-editions of his Socratic and non-Socratic works⁶⁶, international Symposia examining in depth their issues from new and fresh viewpoints, articles, monographs and volumes of collected essays increase from year to year. The emerging picture is one of great

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ For full bibliography on Xenophon see L.-A. Dorion, 'Bibliographie', in M. Bandini-L.-A. Dorion (eds.), *Xénophon. Mémoires* (2000¹), 'Introduction Générale', Livre I, Paris 2003², ccciii-cccxvii; and "Les écrits socratiques de Xénophon: supplément bibliographique (1984-2008)", in M. Narcy-A. Tordesillas (éds.), *Xénophon et Socrate. Actes du Colloque d'Aix-en Provence (6-9 novembre 2003)*, Paris 2008, 283-300. Further bibliographical reference both in V. Azoulay, *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir. De la charis au charisme*, Paris 2004, and C. Tuplin, *Xenophon and His World. Papers From a Conference Held in Liverpool July 1999*, Stuttgart 2004.

⁶⁶ The most important of which is that of the *Memorabilia* by L.-A. Dorion (see previous note), which is in progress (only volume I appeared). In the English-speaking countries a revival in studies related to Xenophon's *non-Socratic* writings occurred as well, with the appearance of numerous annotated translations: *Cyn.* Doty 2001; *Cyr.* Ambler 2001; *Lac.* Lipka 2002; *Hi., Por.* Doty 2003; *An.* Waterfield 2005; *Hell.* Doty 2006; *Lac.* Jackson 2007; *An.* Daykins 2007; *Hi., Lac., Ath.* Gray 2007; *An.* Ambler 2008; *Hell.* Strassler 2009. On these issues plenty of collective and monographic works have been published as well: G. Hutchinson, *Xenophon and the Art of Command*, London–Mechanicsburg PA 2000; C. Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*, Berkeley CA 2001; T. Rood, *The Sea! The Sea! The Shout of the Ten Thousand in the Modern Imagination*, London 2004; C. Bearzot, *Federalismo e autonomia nelle Elleniche di Senofonte*, Milano 2004; V. Azoulay, *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir*, cit.; R.L. Fox (ed.), *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, New Haven CT 2004; R. Waterfield, *Xenophon's Retreat: Greece, Persia and the End of the Golden Age*, Cambridge MA 2006; V. Gray (ed.), *Xenophon*, New York–Oxford 2010.

accuracy, since the Xenophontic *corpus* has been studied both in detail and in its wholeness: conferences like that in Philadelphia in 2007 or those held in Liverpool in 1999⁶⁷ and 2009⁶⁸ tackle a variety of aspects, ranging from philosophy (Socrates) to classics, history, politics, and warfare. In Liverpool, scholars were invited to present their research in progress: the contributions dealing with Xenophon's Socratic works concentrated on the trial⁶⁹, on the Laws of the City⁷⁰, on *sophia*⁷¹, and on the *Symposium*⁷².

The rehabilitation of Xenophon as a philosophical writer owes much to three other conferences, the Proceedings of which have recently appeared:

⁶⁷ The Proceedings were edited by C. Tuplin, *Xenophon and His World*, cit. Following essays of the volume deal with Socrates: R. Waterfield, "Xenophon's Socratic Mission" (79-114); F. Roscalla, "*Kalokagathia e kaloikagathoi* in Senofonte" (115-124); C. Hindley, "Sophron Eros: Xenophon's Ethical Erotics" (125-146).

⁶⁸ The conference in Philadelphia dealt with *Xenophon and Xenophon Studies*. It took place at the 2007 NPSA annual meeting on November, 15-17, and was organized by Dustin A. Gish (Ohio). The Liverpool meeting of 2009 was more focused (being entitled *Xenophon: Ethical Principle and Historical Enquiry*), although the speeches were very short (max. 5-10 min. each). It took place on July, 8-11.

⁶⁹ R. Waterfield: "Xenophon on Socrates' Trial and Death"; M. Stokes: "Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.1-2 and Plato *Apology*: Some Comparisons"; K. Sanders: "Don't Blame Socrates (*Mem.* I 2, 40-46)".

⁷⁰ G. Daverio: "Socrates' *homonoiia* and Xenophon (*Mem.* IV 4, 15-16)"; V. Gray: "Xenophon and Law"; D.M. Johnson: "Strauss's Xenophon".

⁷¹ L.-A. Dorion: "La nature et le statut de la *sophia* dans les *Mémorables*".

⁷² J. Vela Tejada: "Why Did Xenophon Write a *Symposium*?". The remaining contributions were on following topics: 1. History, Politics and Warfare: E. Almagor, L. Asmonti, E. Baragwanath, C. Bearzot, E. Bianco, H. Bowden, S. Brennan, G. Cuniberti, G. Danzig, P. Demont, J. Dillery, S. Ferrario, T. Figueira, D. Gera, D. Gish, R. Harman, L. Hau, J. Henderson, F. Hobden, N. Humble, J. Jansen, A. Keaveney, R. Kroeker, B. LaForse, E. Millender, A. Paradiso, P. Pontier, F. Pownall, J. Roy, E. Rung, J. Rzepka, G. Schepens, S. Schorn, N. Sekunda, M. Sordi, P. de Souza, J. Stronk, M. Tamiolaki; 2. Literature: L. L'Allier, R. Nicolai, T. Rood.

Aix-en-Provence⁷³, Palermo⁷⁴, and Rome⁷⁵. These Symposia focused on special aspects of Xenophon's Socratic works, showing how valuable these can be to our understanding of core issues of Socrates' thought and life. The same approach characterizes the monographic issue of *Les Études Philosophiques* (2004/2)⁷⁶.

⁷³ The conference in Aix was held on November, 6-9, 2003. It saw the participation of J.-B. Gourinat, "La dialectique de Socrate selon les *Mémorables* de Xénophon"; H.-O. Ney, "Y a-t-il un art de penser? La *technē* manquante de l'enseignement socratique dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon"; F. Renaud, "Les *Mémorables* de Xénophon et le *Gorgias* de Platon. Étude comparative des stratégies de questionnement"; L. Rossetti, "Savoir imiter c'est connaître: le cas de *Mémorables* III, 8"; A. de Tordesillas, "Socrate et Prodicos dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon"; L.-A. Dorion, "Socrate et l'*oikonomia*"; V. Nikolaidou-Kyrianiidou, "Autonomie et obéissance. Le maître idéal de Xénophon face à son idéal de prince"; D. Plácido, "L'historicité du personnage de Socrate dans l'*Économique* de Xénophon"; T. Calvo Martínez, "La religiosité de Socrate chez Xénophon"; A. Stavru, "Socrate et la confiance dans les *agraphoi nomoi*: Xénophon, *Mémorables* IV 4, 19-25. Réflexions sur les *socratica* de Walter Friedrich Otto"; D.R. Morrison, "Le Socrate de Xénophon et la psychologie morale"; and M. Nancy, "Socrate et son âme dans les *Mémorables*". All of these contributions are now contained in the volume by M. Nancy–A. Tordesillas (éds.), *Xénophon et Socrate*, cit. See the thoughtful reviews of D.M. Johnson (<http://bmc.brynmawr.edu/2009/2009-03-20.html>) and G. Danzig, *The Classical Review* 60 (2010), 40-42.

⁷⁴ The Symposium in Palermo was held on January, 26-28, 2006. The papers were the following: M. Nancy, "Che cosa è un dialogo socratico?"; and "La Teodote di Senofonte: un Alcibiade al femminile"; L. Rossetti, "L'*Eutidemo* di Senofonte: *Memorabili* IV", and "Il dialogo socratico come unità comunicazionale 'aperta'"; G. Mazzara, "La morale di Socrate è teonoma? Aspetti convergenti della religiosità socratica in Senofonte, *Memorabili* I 4-IV 3 e in Platone, *Alcibiade I e Apologia*", and "*Memorabili* IV 4. Nel dialogo tra Socrate ed Ippia chi dei due è plagiato dall'altro?". These papers are now available in G. Mazzara (ed.), *Il Socrate dei dialoghi*, cit.

⁷⁵ The Symposium in Rome was held in honour of Gabriele Giannantoni. It took place on Dec 18, 2008, and focused on Xenophon's Socrates (with the exception of Berti's paper): A. Brancacci, "Le concezioni di Socrate nei capitoli teleologici dei *Memorabili*", L.-A. Dorion, "La nature et le statut de la *sophia* dans les *Mémorables*"; C. Horn, "Socrates on Political Thought: The Testimonies of Plato and Xenophon"; E. Berti, "Socrate e la scienza dei contrari secondo Aristotele"; D. Sedley, "Socrates' Place in the History of Teleology". The conferences have been published in a monographic issue of *Elenchos* (29/2, 2008).

⁷⁶ It has been edited by L.A. Dorion and L. Brisson with the title *Les écrits socratiques de Xénophon*. Papers included: L.A. Brisson–L.-A. Dorion, "Pour une relecture des écrits socratiques de Xénophon"; V.J. Gray, "Le Socrate de Xénophon et la démocratie"; D.R. Morrison, "Tyrannie et royauté selon le Socrate de Xénophon"; A. Brancacci, "Socrate, la musique et la danse. Aristophane, Xénophon, Platon"; M. Nancy, "La meilleure amie de Socrate. Xénophon, *Mémorables* III, 11"; L.-A. Dorion, "Qu'est-ce que vivre en accord avec sa *dunamis*? Les deux réponses de Socrate dans les *Mémorables*".

This reprise in Xenophons' fortunes has an international character. If some years ago the scholars dealing with Xenophon's Socrates were mainly French-speaking (such as Louis-André Dorion and Michel Narcy⁷⁷), nowadays they come from different regions of the world, and the literature they produce is also in English (Donald Morrison⁷⁸, Vivienne Gray⁷⁹, David

⁷⁷ The works of Michel Narcy go back to the 1990s, when he was one of the few continental scholars dealing with Xenophon's Socrates. His articles dwell mostly on the *Memorabilia*, on a variety of passages (such as II 1, III 11, IV 4) as well as of topics (i.e. the soul, Theodote, the composition of the third book): see "Le choix d'Aristippe (Xénophon, *Mémorables* II 1)", in G. Giannantoni *et al.*, *La tradizione socratica*, Napoli 1995, 71-87; "La religion de Socrate dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon", in G. Giannantoni-M. Narcy (eds.), *Lezioni socratiche*, Napoli 1997, 13-28; "La meilleure amie de Socrate. Xénophon, *Mémorables*, III 11", *cit.*, 213-234; "Socrates Sentenced by His *Daimôn*", in P. Destrée-N.D. Smith (eds.), *Socrates' Divine Sign*, *cit.*, 113-125; "Che cosa è un dialogo socratico?", *cit.*; "La Teodote di Senofonte: un Alcibiade al femminile?", *cit.*, 53-62; 'Sokratik', in G. Ueding (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Tübingen 2007, v. VIII, 952-959; "Socrate et son âme dans les *Mémorables*", *cit.*, 29-47; "Sur la composition du livre III des *Mémorables* de Xénophon", in M. Broze-B. Decharneux-S. Delcomminette (eds.), *'Mais raconte-moi en détail...': Mélanges de philosophie et de philologie offerts à Lambros Couloubaritsis*, Bruxelles-Paris 2008, 245-257; "Pourquoi Socrate?", in F. Alesse *et al.* (eds.), *Anthropine sophia*, *cit.*, 55-68.

⁷⁸ Donald Morrison has been a pioneer in rediscovering Xenophon's philosophical value since his seminal article of 1987: "On Professor Vlastos' Xenophon", *Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1987), 9-22. See as well his *Bibliography of Editions, Translations, and Commentaries on Xenophon's Socratic Writings 1600-Present*, Pittsburgh PA 1988; "Xenophon's Socrates as a Teacher", in P. Vander Waerdt (ed.), *The Socratic Movement*, Ithaca NY 1994, 181-208; "Xenophon's Socrates on the Just and the Lawful", *Ancient Philosophy* 15 (1995), 329-347; "Tyrannie et royauté selon le Socrate de Xénophon", *cit.*, 177-192; 'Socrates', in M.L. Gill-P. Pellegrin (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, Malden MA 2006 (http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid=683/tocnode?id=g9780631210610_chunk_g978063121061011); "Remarques sur la psychologie morale de Xénophon", *cit.*, 11-28. Most recently, Morrison edited *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates* (available from October 2010), with the following contributions: "The Rise and Fall of the Socratic Problem" (L.-A. Dorion), "The Students of Socrates" (K. Döring), "Xenophon and the Envious Life of Socrates" (D.K. O'Connor), "Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*" (D. Konstan), "Socrates and the New Learning" (P. Woodruff), "Socratic Religion" (M.L. McPherran), "Socrates and Democratic Athens" (J. Ober), "Socratic Method" (H.H. Benson), "Self-Examination" (C. Rowe), "Socratic Ignorance" (R. Bett), "Reconsidering Socratic Irony" (M. Lane), "Socratic Ethics and the Socratic Psychology of Action: A Philosophical Framework" (T. Penner), "Socrates and *Eudaimonia*" (C. Bobonich), "Socrates' Political Philosophy" (C.L. Griswold), "Socrates in Later Greek Philosophy" (A.A. Long).

⁷⁹ Vivienne Gray is also working on Xenophon since the 1980s. She edited various commented editions of Xenophon's writings, both Socratic and non-Socratic: "Xenophon's

Johnson⁸⁰, Gabriel Danzig⁸¹), Italian (Livio Rossetti⁸², Aldo Brancacci⁸³, Carlo

Symposion. The Display of Wisdom”, *Hermes* 120 (1992), 58-75; *The Framing of Socrates. The Literary Interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia*, Stuttgart 1998; *Xenophon on Government*, Cambridge 2007. See as well her last articles “Interventions and Citations in Xenophon, *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*”, *Classical Quarterly* 53 (2003), 111-123; “Le Socrate de Xénophon et la démocratie”, cit.; “The Linguistic Philosophies of Prodicus in Xenophon’s *Choice of Heracles?*”, *Classical Quarterly* 56 (2006), 426-435. Recently, Gray edited also a collective volume (*Xenophon*, cit.), which contains contributions on Socrates that had already appeared previously: “Xenophon’s Socrates as a Teacher” (Morrison), “Xenophon’s Socrates as a Dialectician” (Patzler), “The Dancing Socrates and the Laughing Xenophon” (Huß), “The Straussian Interpretation of Xenophon: the Paradigmatic Case of *Memorabilia* IV, 4” (Dorion).

⁸⁰ See David Johnson’s edition *Socrates and Alcibiades: Four Texts* (intr., transl., ann.), Newburyport MA 2003. Johnson’s articles deal with a variety of topics: “Ischomachus the Model Husband? A Moderately Ironic Reading of Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the APA, 2002 (<http://www.apaclassics.org/AnnualMeeting/02mtg/abstracts/dmjohanson.html>); “Socrates and Theodote: *Memorabilia* 3.11”, APA 2003 (<http://www.apaclassics.org/AnnualMeeting/03mtg/abstracts/Johnson.html>); “Xenophon’s Socrates on Law and Justice”, *Ancient Philosophy* 23 (2003), 255-281 (see the comment by V. Gray, “A Short Response to David M. Johnson ‘Xenophon’s Socrates on Law and Justice’”, *Ancient Philosophy* 24, 2004, 442-446, and the counter-reply by Johnson: “Reply to Vivienne Gray”, 446-448); “Socrates’ Lesson for Critobulus: A Reading of Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*”, One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the CAMWS, 2004 (<http://www.camws.org/meeting/2004/abstracts2004/johnson.html>); “Xenophon at His Most Socratic (*Memorabilia* 4.2)”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2005), 39-73; “‘By Hera’ in Xenophon”, CAMWS 2008 (<http://www.camws.org/meeting/2009/program/abstracts/12F1.JohnsonDM.pdf>); “Aristippus at the Crossroads: The Politics of Pleasure in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*”, *Polis* 26 (2009), 204-222.

⁸¹ Gabriel Danzig translated Xenophon’s Socratic writings into Hebrew with notes, an introduction and interpretive essays (Jerusalem 2002). He published articles on following topics: “La prétendue rivalité entre Platon et Xénophon”, *Revue française d'histoire des idées politiques* 16 (2002), 351-368; “Why Socrates Was Not a Farmer: The *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon as a Philosophical Dialogue”, *Greece and Rome* 50 (2003), 57-76; “Apologizing for Socrates. Plato and Xenophon on Socrates’ Behavior in Court”, *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 133 (2003), 281-321; “Apologetic Elements in Xenophon’s *Symposium*”, *Classica et Mediaevalia* 55 (2005), 17-48; “Intra-Socratic Polemics: The *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon”, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 45 (2005), 331-357.

⁸² L. Rossetti, “L’Eutidemo di Senofonte: *Memorabili* IV 2”, in G. Mazzara (ed.), *Il Socrate dei dialoghi*, cit., 63-103; “Socrate *enkratês*”, *Zbornik* 10 (2008), 65-79; “Sócrates y la cultura del autocontrol”, *Limes* 20 (2008), 39-52; “Savoir imiter c’est connaître: le cas de *Mémorables* III 8”, cit., 111-127; “Socrate ha segnato un’epoca?” in C. Fornis, J. Gallego, P. López Barja, M. Valdés (eds.), *Dialéctica histórica y compromiso social. Homenaje a Domingo Plácido*, Zaragoza 2010.

⁸³ A. Brancacci, “*Ethos e pathos* nella teoria delle arti. Una poetica socratica della pittura

Natali⁸⁴), and German (Christian Mueller-Goldingen⁸⁵).

Louis-André Dorion's edition of the *Memorabilia* plays a leading part in this process. Still in progress (only Book I has appeared)⁸⁶, it collects most of what is produced around the world, applying it in comprehensive notes to particular passages of Xenophon's work. In conjunction with Dorion's precious work on single issues⁸⁷ are his arguments for the rehabilitation of Xenophon's Socrates (whom he calls 'Socrates^x', juxtaposing him to the 'Socrates^p' of Plato's dialogues)⁸⁸: (1) Scepticism about Socrates^x did not exist before the beginning of the Nineteenth Century; (2) Socrates^x had a profound influence on many ancient authors, such as the Stoics; and (3) Not all modern and contemporary philosophers have accepted Schleiermacher's criticism; Nietzsche, for example⁸⁹.

e della scultura", *Elenchos* 16 (1995), 103-127; "Socrate, la musique et la danse", cit.; "Le concezioni di Socrate nei capitoli teleologici dei *Memorabilia*", *Elenchos* 29 (2008), 233-252.

⁸⁴ C. Natali, "Socrate dans l'Économique de Xénophon", cit., 263-288; "Socrates' Dialectic in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*", in V. Karasmanis (ed.), *Socrates: 2400 Years Since His Death*, cit., 15-28; 'Senofonte', in *Enciclopedia filosofica*, Milano 2006, vol. XI, 10461-10462.

⁸⁵ C. Mueller-Goldingen, "Xenophons *Memorabilien* – Bemerkungen zu einem missverstandenen Werk der sokratischen Philosophie", in Id., *Das Kleine und das Große. Essays zur antiken Kultur und Geistesgeschichte*, München–Leipzig 2004, 106 s., and *Xenophon. Philosophie und Geschichte*, Darmstadt 2007, esp. the chapters II-IV: 'Xenophons Sokrates über die Götter' (19-28), 'Sokrates und die Naturphilosophie' (29-36), 'Sokrates auf der Suche nach Fixpunkten' (37-44).

⁸⁶ See above, notes 65 and 66.

⁸⁷ L.-A. Dorion, "A l'origine de la question socratique", cit.; "L'exégèse straussienne de Xénophon: le cas paradigmatique de *Mémorables* IV 4", *Philosophie Antique* 1 (2001), 87-118; "Socrate, le *daimonion* et la divination", in J. Laurent (éd.), *Les dieux de Platon*, Caen 2003, 169-192; "The *Daimonion* and the *Megalēgoria* of Socrates in Xenophon's *Apology*", in P. Destrée–N.D. Smith (eds.), "Socrates' Divine Sign", cit., 109-128; "Akrasia et *enkrateia* dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon", *Dialogue* 42 (2003), 648-672; "Qu'est-ce que vivre es fonction de sa *dunamis*?", cit., 235-252; "Socrate et la *basilikē tekhnē*: essai d'exégèse comparative", in V. Karasmanis (ed.), *Socrates*, cit., 51-62; "Xenophon's Socrates", cit.; "Socrate *oikonomikos*", in M. Narcy–A. Tordesillas (éds.), *Xénophon et Socrate*, cit., 253-281.

⁸⁸ This distinction recalls Vlastos' famous account on Plato's two Socrateses. The first scholar talking about a 'Socrates^x' had been V. Tejera, "What We Don't Know about Plato and Socrates", in Id., *Rewriting the History of Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Westport CT–London 1997, 105-119, spec. 111 s., the general approach being however different from that of Dorion.

⁸⁹ L.-A. Dorion, "Xenophon's Socrates", cit., 94. Dorion's distinction between a Socrates^x and a Socrates^p occurs as well in *Socrate*, Paris 2004, 96-113, in "La nature et le statut de la *sophia* dans les *Mémorables*", *Elenchos* 29 (2008), 253-277, esp. 253 and 258, and in his essay contained in this volume.

Recent work on Xenophon's Socratic writings suggests that it would be more correct to speak of at least three Socrateses in Xenophon: the main figure of the *Memorabilia* (itself multi-faceted) is very different in turn from that of the *Symposium* or the *Oeconomicus*⁹⁰. Moreover, these figures seem to have various points in common with other paradigmatic personalities portrayed in the Xenophontic *corpus*, such as Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Lycurgus⁹¹. A sound approach to the tackling of such a complex problem is therefore to single out these various Socrateses, in hopes of characterizing each of them in detail. This method has been used for the *Symposium* as well as for the *Oeconomicus*, with interesting results. A turning point in the study of the first of these two dialogues is represented by Bernhard Huß's commentary⁹², a tool which has become indispensable for all further work on the matter. Since its publication, dramatic, literary, and aesthetic aspects of the *Symposium*⁹³, both in terms of its general structure or of parts of it, have been studied anew⁹⁴. Two thoughtful essays have been written on dance, a topic stretching throughout the dialogue⁹⁵. A little less focused have been contributions on the *Oeconomicus*, a work precious for its description of «not very well known social habits of Fifth and Fourth Century Athens»⁹⁶. Here a uniquely 'expert' Socrates is portrayed, as articles by Louis-André Dorion, David Johnson, and

⁹⁰ On this crucial point, see A. Brancacci, "Socrate, la musique et la danse", cit., 196-197; D.L. Gera, "Xenophon's Socrateses", in: M. Trapp (ed.), *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, cit., 33-50.

⁹¹ See B. Huß, *Xenophons Symposium: Ein Kommentar*, Stuttgart–Leipzig 1999, esp. 25-30.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ A well contextualized study, containing an impressive bibliography on the *Symposium*, is that of F. Hobden, "How To Be a Good Symposiast and Other Lessons From Xenophon's *Symposium*", *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 50 (2004), 121-140. Precious reference can be found also in B. Huß, *Xenophons Symposium*, cit., 457-490.

⁹⁴ D. Gilula, "Entertainment at Xenophon's *Symposium*", *Athenaeum* 90 (2002), 207-213; M.-H. Garelli-François, "Le spectacle final du *Banquet* de Xénophon: le genre et le sens", *Pallas* 59 (2002), 177-186 ; A. Andrisano, "Les performances du *Symposion* de Xénophon", *Pallas* 63 (2003), 287-302.

⁹⁵ A. Brancacci, "Socrate, la musique et la danse", cit., and V. Wohl, "Dirty Dancing: Xenophon's *Symposium*", in P. Murray–P. Wilson (eds.), *Music and the Muses. The Culture of Mousikē in the Classical Athenian City*, Oxford 2004, 337-363.

⁹⁶ F. Roscalla (ed.), *Senofonte. Economico*, Milano 2000, 5.

Carlo Natali have shown⁹⁷. His wisdom in matters such as horse riding or house building is surprising indeed, and has attracted the interest of both historians and archaeologists⁹⁸. Outlining the possible historical features of this figure is not an easy task⁹⁹, since his teachings are a great deal more subtle and complex than they appear¹⁰⁰.

An important issue for the rehabilitation of Xenophon's philosophical value is that of religion. Seminal passages of the *Memorabilia* (especially I 4 and IV 3) contain a fully developed theory of teleological theology which has no parallels in antiquity. Starting from an essay by Mark McPherran¹⁰¹, in recent years scholarship has focused on the matter with increasing attention¹⁰². Recently, David Sedley has argued that «this is the earliest occurrence of the Argument from Design», and that «it is presumably no accident that Socrates should be its author»¹⁰³. The originality of Xenophon's account if compared with other cosmological theories, especially those occurring in Plato's *Timaeus* and *Hippias Major* (which according to Sedley simply con-

⁹⁷ See L.-A. Dorion, "Socrate *oikonomikos*", cit.; D.M. Johnson, "Ischomachus the Model Husband?", and "Socrates' Lesson for Critobulus" (cit.); C. Natali, "Socrate dans l'Économique de Xénophon", cit.

⁹⁸ See e.g. F. Pesando, *La casa dei Greci* (Milano 2006), who sees in this dialogue a seminal source for understanding the technique of housebuilding in ancient Greece.

⁹⁹ D. Plácido, "L'historicité de Socrate dans l'Économique", cit., 235-251.

¹⁰⁰ S. Föllinger, "Sokrates als Ökonom? Eine Analyse der didaktischen Gestaltung von Xenophons *Oikonomikos*", *Würzburger Jahrbücher für Altertumswissenschaft* 30 (2006), 5-23.

¹⁰¹ M.L. McPherran, "Socrates on Teleological and Moral Theology", *Ancient Philosophy* 14 (1994), 245-262.

¹⁰² M. Narcy, "La religion de Socrate dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon", cit., 15-28; J. Bremmer, "The Reciprocity of Giving and Thanksgiving in Greek Worship", in C. Gill-N. Postlethwaite-R. Seaford (eds.), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, Oxford 1998, 127-137; C. Viano, "La cosmologie de Socrate dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon", in G.R. Dherbey-J.-B. Gourinat (éds.), *Socrate et les Socratiques*, cit., 98-119; G. Mazzara, "La morale di Socrate è teonoma?", cit., 105-138; T. Calvo Martinez, "La religiosité de Socrate chez Xénophon", cit., 49-63; V. Azoulay, "Xénophon et le modèle divin de l'autorité", *Cahiers des études anciennes* 45 (2008), 151-183; N. Powers, "The Natural Theology of Xenophon's Socrates", *Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2009), 249-266.

¹⁰³ D. Sedley, *Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity*, cit., 86. See esp. the chapter on 'Socrates' (75-92).

firm the authenticity of Xenophon's passages)¹⁰⁴, leads Sedley to reevaluate Xenophon's Socratic writings altogether: «it is because Plato's brilliant dialogues have eclipsed all our other sources on Socrates that the vital material in Xenophon has been insufficiently appreciated»¹⁰⁵. A brief look at the reception of Xenophon's creationist and teleological theories in antiquity is sufficient to understand their importance. Aristotle, for instance, was strongly influenced by *Mem.* I 4 and IV 3, probably via Plato¹⁰⁶. The same applies to the Stoics, who inherited these theories and worked them out systematically¹⁰⁷. And even to Galen, who owes much of his «standing as antiquity's foremost medical authority... to his systematic application of teleological principles to human anatomy»¹⁰⁸. In conclusion, Sedley argues that «[Xenophon's] Socrates marks a key moment in the history of teleology. His significance for that history lies in his introduction of ideas – about values, craft, intelligence and divinity – which were to become central to the teleology of Plato, and in due course to exercise a profound influence on Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen»¹⁰⁹.

This seminal role of *Memorabilia* I 4 and IV 3 is also acknowledged by

¹⁰⁴ Following Sedley, "Socrates' Place in the History of Teleology", cit., 325, various passages of the *Timaeus* confirm the creationism of *Mem.* I 4, while *Hipp. Maj.* 289d-291c echoes the teleologism of *Symp.* 5 and *Mem.* III 8.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ See esp. *Pol.* 1256b10-22; *De part. anim.* 658b14-26 and 661b6-9; *Phys.* 198b24-26.

¹⁰⁷ D. Sedley, "Socrates' Place in the History of Teleology", cit., 329. Sedley shows how through the Stoics the tradition of Xenophontic teleologism reached until William Paley, a theologian who inspired even Charles Darwin (329-330). And even further: in *Mem.* III 8, 8-10 «Socrates sets out his remarkable views on architecture, views which would not have looked altogether out of place in the Bauhaus» (332-333).

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 317. As Sedley puts it, «Galen picks out Socrates, among all his predecessors, as the most sound in his approach to science. Socrates, he explains, as correctly represented by Xenophon, did not waste time on unanswerable questions such as the origin of the world, but concentrated on attainable goods, a priority which Galen sees as the ultimate focus of his own work too» (*ibid.*).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 334. «Socrates is in short a maximalist about theology, a minimalist about physics. And it is thanks to his theology that, despite his abstention from physical speculation of his own, he was able to exert a seminal impact on the teleological physics of his successors... Three features of Socrates' thought... cemented his influence on his successors' teleology: (1) his brand of religiosity; (2) his moral psychology; and (3) his interest in the structure of craft» (321-322).

Aldo Brancacci, who considers these passages among «the richest and most meaningful of Xenophon's corpus altogether», as «they constitute the foundation of philosophical anthropocentrism in Western tradition»¹¹⁰. Brancacci dwells on the lost sources on which they depend, which could be Criton's *Peri tou theiou* or Simon's *Peri theōn*, and comes to the conclusion that here Xenophon is probably relying on memories or transcriptions of actual discourses of Socrates (and not on writings about him by Antisthenes). These passages can therefore be traced back to the 'naturalistic' period of Socrates' philosophical activity (as reported by the Socratics): «what is sure about the two chapters of the *Memorabilia* is that they reflect a theoretical issue of Socraticism. Here the study of nature, which in Archelaus and Diogenes of Apollonia was progressively losing the physical and rationalistic character it had with Anaxagoras, and was becoming more spiritual (i.e. in Diogenes' theory of *nous*), turns sharply into a teleologic and providentialistic view»¹¹¹.

Another important topic in Xenophon's Socrates is politics. Various passages of the *Memorabilia* portray him in conversation with influential persons of his time: sophists, politicians, and wealthy men. Very interesting, for example, are his dialogues with Prodicus and Hippias, on which useful articles have appeared¹¹². Concerning Socrates' political attitudes, a remarkable essay by Christoph Horn¹¹³ has shown the value of Xenophon's accounts (*Mem.* I 1, 5-9; IV 2, 24-27 and 31-36; IV 3, 11-12) if compared to parallel texts in Plato (*Apol.*; *Crit* 49c-d; *Gorg.* 508e-509a; *Euthyd.* 279c-280).

¹¹⁰ A. Brancacci, "Le concezioni di Socrate nei capitoli teleologici dei *Memorabili*", cit., 233.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 249-250.

¹¹² For a general overview on Socrates' relations with the sophists according to Xenophon see D.M. Schaps, "Socrates and the Socratics: When Wealth Became a Problem", *Classical World* 96 (2003), 131-157. The conversation with Prodicus (containing the famous account of Heracles' Choice) has been studied by V. Gray, "The Linguistic Philosophies of Prodicus in Xenophon's *Choice of Heracles*?", cit., and A. de Tordesillas, "Socrate et Prodicos dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon", cit., 87-109. For Hippias see G. Mazzara, "*Memorabili* IV 4. Nel dialogo tra Socrate ed Ippia chi dei due è plagiato dall'altro?", cit., 139-160.

¹¹³ C. Horn, "Socrates on Political Thought: The Testimonies of Plato and Xenophon", *Elenchos* 29 (2008), 279-301. On the same issue see as well O. Chernyakhovskaya, "Xenophon on Socrates' Political Attitudes", *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 32 (2008), 35-56, and C. McNamara, "The Socratic Political Education in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*", paper presented at the AMMPA, 2009.

According to Horn, the first testimony is «much clearer and doxographically more persuasive»¹¹⁴ than the latter for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that in the *Memorabilia* «Socrates describes himself both as dedicated to politics and as opposed to it»¹¹⁵. Hence «the philosophical quality and the historical authenticity of Xenophon's description of Socrates ... Xenophon spells out with clarity what Plato is only hinting at. Both authors attribute to Socrates the view that wisdom or knowledge guarantees someone's success; but what Xenophon makes explicit and Plato leaves out is that full wisdom can only be possessed by the gods»¹¹⁶.

Xenophon is also more detailed than Plato when discussing Socrates' relation to two paradigmatic women, Theodote and Xanthippe. Far from being simple curiosities, the episodes he narrates about them are indeed interesting for his general views on beauty, friendship, and temperance. Michel Narcy has in this regard pointed out significant parallelisms between Xenophon's Theodote and Plato's Alcibiades¹¹⁷, while Michael Weithmann has studied in depth the myth of Xanthippe's bad temper from Antiquity to modern times, tracing its origin back to Xenophon¹¹⁸.

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Let us move on, now, to Plato's Socrates, an issue on which the scholarly literature is boundless. In recent years major collective volumes on Plato have appeared, in which a series of questions linked to his portrayal of Socrates have been raised: *New Perspectives on Plato*¹¹⁹, the *Companion to*

¹¹⁴ C. Horn, "Socrates on Political Thought", cit., 295.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 281.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 295-296.

¹¹⁷ M. Narcy, "La meilleure amie de Socrate", and "La Teodote di Senofonte" (cit.). See as well D.M. Johnson's "Ischomachus the Model Husband", and "Socrates and Theodote" (cit.). More on Xenophon's ambivalent view of women in Y. Lee Too, "The Economics of Pedagogy: Xenophon's Wifely Didactics", *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 47 (2001), 65-80.

¹¹⁸ See M.W. Weithmann, *Xanthippe und Sokrates. Ehe, Sex und Gender im antiken Athen: ein Beitrag zu höherem historischem Klatsch*, München 2003.

¹¹⁹ J. Annas-C. Rowe (eds.), *New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient*, Cambridge MA 2002, 189-212.

*Plato*¹²⁰, the *Handbook of Plato*¹²¹, and the *Platon-Handbuch*¹²². These volumes are very instructive, as they feature on the one hand the heritage of Vlastos' 'developmentalist' model (still popular among many scholars), and on the other the different theories arising from its weaknesses.

One of the most fervent supporters of Vlastos' claims is Terry Penner¹²³. This scholar adheres not only to the idea of an evolution from a Socrates^E to a Socrates^M, but also to that of a correspondence between the Socrates^E and the historical Socrates. What differentiates Penner from Vlastos is his disavowal of a 'moralist' Socrates: according to Penner, Socrates' theory is on the contrary psychologically egoistic, eudaimonistic, intellectualistic, and deterministic. A similar view is maintained by a former student of Penner's, Naomi Reshotko¹²⁴. She holds that Plato's early dialogues do not advance a prescriptive theory, but a descriptive one: «Human happiness is an objective goal. It can be approached using one's appreciation of what the world is like and how one can work within the constraints that nature places upon us ... in

¹²⁰ H.H. Benson (ed.), *A Companion to Plato*, Malden MA 2006. The contributions explicitly dealing with Plato's Socrates are the following: C.M. Young, "The Socratic Elenchus" (55-69), G.B. Matthews, "Socratic Ignorance" (103-118), T. Penner, "The Forms and the Sciences in Socrates and Plato" (133-145), T.C. Brickhouse–N.D. Smith, "The Socratic Paradoxes" (263-277).

¹²¹ G. Fine (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*, Oxford 2008. On Socrates see esp. G.B. Matthews, "The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Socrates" (114-138) and D. Devereux, "Socratic Ethics and Moral Psychology" (139-164).

¹²² C. Horn–J. Müller–J. Söder, *Platon-Handbuch*, cit.

¹²³ See esp. Penner's "The Historical Socrates and Plato's Early Dialogues: Some Philosophical Considerations", in J. Annas–C. Rowe (eds.), *New Perspectives on Plato*, cit., 189-212; "Socratic Ethics: Ultra-Realism, Determinism, and Ethical Truth", in C. Gill (ed.), *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity*, Oxford 2005, 157-187; "The Death of the So-Called 'Socratic Elenchus'", in M. Erler–L. Brisson (eds.), *Gorgias-Menon: Selected Papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum*, Sankt Augustin 2007, 3-19; "The Good, Advantage, Happiness, and the Form of the Good: How Continuous with Socratic Ethics is Platonic Ethics?", in D. Cairns–F.-G. Herrmann–T. Penner (eds.), *Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato's Republic*, Edinburgh 2007, 93-123; "Socratic Ethics and the Socratic Psychology of Action", cit.

¹²⁴ N. Reshotko, *Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-Good-Nor-Bad*, Cambridge 2006. On this book see the thorough review of D. Wolfsdorf, <http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=8503>. See as well N. Reshotko (ed.), *Socrates and Plato: Desire, Identity, and Existence*, Edmonton 2003.

order to change it»¹²⁵. In Reshotko's view, Socrates' theory of happiness is therefore dominated both by psychological egoism (everyone aims to pursue his self-interest) and hedonistic intellectualism (everyone always employs what he believes is the best means to the best end).

Vlastos' claim of reconstructing a historical Socrates from Plato's early dialogues can be noticed in a variety of other scholars, who also accept the distinction between the two Socrateses¹²⁶. Particularly interesting is the standpoint of Debra Nails, who acknowledges «the beauty of Vlastos's particular configuration and its fecundity» as well as «the gold Vlastos had uncovered»¹²⁷. According to Nails, Plato's dialogues feature a «historical Socrates»; therefore, it is possible to relate this figure to «the context of Athenian history». Nails does so¹²⁸, apparently underestimating the fictional character of these writings, i.e. the fact that they *were not* historical accounts, being often composed many years after the dates of their dramatic settings¹²⁹.

A moderately developmentalist position can also be found in the posthumously edited book of Gabriele Giannantoni¹³⁰, who differentiates various

¹²⁵ N. Reshotko, *Socratic Virtue*, cit., 14.

¹²⁶ See M.N. Forster, "Socrates' Demand for Definitions", and "Socrates' Profession of Ignorance", both *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 31 (2006), 1-47 and 32 (2007), 1-35 respectively; I. Vasilioiu, *Aiming at Virtue in Plato*, Cambridge 2008; H. Segvic, *From Protagoras to Aristotle. Essays in Ancient Moral Philosophy*, ed. M. Burnyeat, Princeton NJ-Oxford 2009, esp. the chapters 'No One Errs Willingly' (47-85), and 'Two or Three Things We Know about Socrates' (181-185); D. Adams, "Socrates' Commitment to the Truth", *Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2009), 267-287.

¹²⁷ D. Nails, *Socrates*, cit., 11 and 12.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 13-26.

¹²⁹ The commonplace of the 'historical Socrates' is spread even among scholars not following Vlastos' model. Klaus Döring holds e.g. the view that a historical Socrates can be found in Plato's *Apology* (see 'Sokrates, die Sokratiker und die von ihnen begründeten Traditionen', in H. Flashar [ed.], *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike* 2/1, Basel 1998, 156): on this issue see as well D.M. Morrison, "On the Alleged Historical Reliability of Plato's *Apology*", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 82 (2000), 235-265. Aldo Brancacci maintains that some features occurring in the *Sokratikoi logoi* may belong to the historical Socrates ("Ethos e pathos nella teoria delle arti", cit., 116 n. 41; "Socrate, la musique et la danse", cit., 204 and 208; "The Double *Daimōn* in Euclides the Socratic", cit., 146; "Le concezioni di Socrate nei capitoli teleologici dei *Memorabili*", cit., 252). On this point see also C. Horn, "Socrates on Political Thought", cit., 279.

¹³⁰ G. Giannantoni, *Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone*, ed. B. Centrone, Napoli 2005.

phases of Plato's production while pointing out that certain features characterise his thought throughout the corpus. Giannantoni, whose Socrates is as a consequence mainly Platonic¹³¹, bases himself not on Vlastos but on the stylometrical studies of Hans Raeder and Constantin Ritter¹³². On the other hand, Livio Rossetti has offered a reinterpretation of the developmental approach which stresses the difference between dialogues where ideas occur but still leave matters open (which entails that the dialogues in question have an unfinished appearance) and dialogues in which substantial bodies of doctrine are taken as basically reliable¹³³.

A decade after Vlastos' death, scholars now speak openly of a 'break-down' of his model¹³⁴. The current arguments used to criticize it are manifold, each of them implying a different approach to the problem of the Platonic Socrates: (1) The importance of Plato's context, that is, the other Socratics, for understanding his portrayal of Socrates as well as single issues linked to it; (2) The importance of not such a context but rather each specific dialogue, which should as a consequence be considered as a unit on its own; (3) The Platonic corpus and its theoretical issues should be considered from a unitarian viewpoint, without assuming different phases of Plato's philosophical production. This entails that Socrates did not influence Plato in any way, but on the contrary that everything philosophically valuable we know about him is a creation of Plato; (4) It is not Plato who created Socrates, but vice versa, since Socrates' influence on Plato made him a Socratic for the rest of his life; (5) The problem of the historical Socrates is unproductive, since it cannot be solved on ground of Plato's (or of the other Socratics') evidence. It should therefore be sidestepped in favour of concentrating on philosophical issues; (6) Plato and the Socratics were the first intellectuals in Antiquity who produced texts bearing an explicit philosophical character. Therefore, these texts are evidence not only of Socrates' teachings, but also of the very first attempts to put down in writing a workable idea of what philosophy may be, and mean.

¹³¹ Another recent Platonic Socrates is that of R. Mugerauer, *Wider das Vergessen des sokratischen Nichtwissens*, cit.

¹³² H.H. Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung*, Leipzig 1905; C. Ritter, *Platon, sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre* (2 vols.), München 1910-1923.

¹³³ L. Rossetti, "I Socratici della prima generazione", cit., esp. 60-67.

¹³⁴ J. Annas-C. Rowe, in: Id. (eds.), *New Perspectives on Plato*, cit., ix.

1. Consequent upon Charles Kahn's book¹³⁵ a series of scholars started focusing on Plato's portrayals of Socrates' interlocutors, with interesting results. John Beversluis' position is particularly instructive, as his viewpoint is not the one commonly held by scholars (whose perspective tends to be that of the character Socrates), but rather that of the 'sparring partners' with whom Socrates engages in conversation¹³⁶. Such a contextualization of Plato's Socrates is provided in detail by two books by Debra Nails and Ruby Blondell¹³⁷, and openly acknowledged by Siem Slings, Christopher Taylor and Klaus Döring, all of them remarking the importance of Socratic literature for an understanding of the spurious dialogues of the Platonic corpus¹³⁸. The authors of the *Platon-Handbuch* go even further, speaking openly of a competition between Plato and the Socratics¹³⁹. The context in which Plato's dialogues developed after 399 should therefore be considered, that is, his rivalry with Antisthenes or the influence exerted on him by Aristippus. According to the *Platon-Handbuch*, attention should be paid to the Socratic movement as whole, considering that Plato emerged from it only gradually.

Single issues linked to Plato's Socrates have also shown the importance of a contextualized approach to the *corpus Platonicum*. Understanding Socrates' argumentative strategy entails closer scrutiny of his relations with the Sophists¹⁴⁰. This topic is tackled in Roslyn Weiss's book, where she maintains that the so-called Socratic 'paradoxes' (no one does wrong willingly, virtue is knowledge, all the virtues are one) should be understood as Socrates'

¹³⁵ C. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, cit.

¹³⁶ J. Beversluis, *Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues*, Cambridge 2000. See the stimulating review of C. Gill, "Speaking up for Plato's Interlocutors. A Discussion of J. Beversluis, *Cross-Examining Socrates*", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 20 (2001), 297-321.

¹³⁷ D. Nails, *The People of Plato*, cit.; R. Blondell, *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues*, Cambridge 2002.

¹³⁸ S.R. Slings, *Plato. Clitophon*, Cambridge 1999; C.C.W. Taylor, "The Origins of Our Present Paradigms", in J. Annas-C. Rowe (eds.), *New Perspectives on Plato*, cit., 73-84; K. Döring (ed., comm.), *Platon. Theages*, Göttingen 2004. For a complete overview on the issue see K. Döring-M. Erler-S. Schorn (eds.), *Pseudoplatonica*, Stuttgart 2005.

¹³⁹ C. Horn-J. Müller-J. Söder, 'Sokrates', cit.

¹⁴⁰ See e.g. S. Broadie, "The Sophists and Socrates", in D. Sedley (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy*, Cambridge 2003, 73-97, esp. 88-95; P. Woodruff, "Socrates among the Sophists", in S. Ahbel-Rappe-R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit., 36-47.

way of combating sophistic views¹⁴¹. According to Weiss, Socrates' need to defeat the Sophists lands him in an awkward position, where he holds views and proffers arguments to which he is not committed – a tactically useful but morally unfair position. Hence her Socrates is not a 'Kantian' seeker of moral truth, but one who manipulates his interlocutors in the name of justice.

Another topic which can be understood more deeply by going beyond the Platonic dialogues is irony¹⁴². Michel Narcy, for example, shows that the irony of the Platonic Socrates is a *hapax*¹⁴³, Melissa Lane points out that it should be examined within a more general picture¹⁴⁴, and David Wolfsdorf tackles it in both Aristophanes and Plato¹⁴⁵. This multi-faceted way of dealing with the problem leads to a different perspective than Vlastos's, as the essays of Giovanni Ferrari and Gail Fine show¹⁴⁶.

The religious views of Plato's Socrates also pose the question of whether to take into account sources other than Plato. The International Conference on 'Socrates' *Daimonion* and Religion', held in Brussels on December 2003, featured papers exemplifying this methodological approach¹⁴⁷. Among them,

¹⁴¹ R. Weiss, *The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies*, Chicago IL 2006.

¹⁴² For a general overview on the issue see S. Pagano, *L'ironia socratica alla luce di recenti studi*, Roma 2009.

¹⁴³ M. Narcy, "Qu'est-ce que l'ironie socratique?", *Plato. The Electronic Journal of the International Plato Society* 1 (2001), <http://gramata.univ-paris1.fr/Plato/article14.html>, and "Un *hapax* dans l'histoire de l'ironie: le Socrate de Platon", *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2 (2002), 300-313.

¹⁴⁴ M. Lane, "The Evolution of *Eirōneia* in Classical Greek Texts: Why Socratic *Eirōneia* Is Not Socratic Irony", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 31 (2006), 49-83, and "Irony in the Soul: Should Plato's Socrates Be Sincere?", in M. Trapp (ed.), *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, cit., 17-32.

¹⁴⁵ D. Wolfsdorf, "The Irony of Socrates", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65 (2007), 175-187, and "Εἰρωνεία in Aristophanes and Plato", *Classical Quarterly* 58 (2008), 666-672.

¹⁴⁶ G.R.F. Ferrari, "Socrates' Irony as Pretence", and G. Fine, "Does Socrates Claim to Know That He Knows Nothing?", both *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 34 (2008), 1-33 and 35 (2008), 49-88 respectively.

¹⁴⁷ The Proceedings appeared: P. Destrée–N.D. Smith (eds.), *Socrates' Divine Sign*, cit., with contributions of L. Brisson ("Socrates and the Divine Signal According to Plato's Testimony: Philosophical Practice as Rooted in Religious Tradition", 1-12), M.L. McPherran ("Introducing a New God: Socrates and His *Daimonion*", 13-30), G. van Riel ("Socrates' *Daemon*: Internalisation of the Divine and Knowledge of the Self", 31-42), T.C.

the paper of Mark McPherran, a scholar working on Socratic religion since the 1990s, deserves a special mention. His publications tackle a variety of issues which do not rely simply on Platonic evidence, for example Socratic teleology¹⁴⁸. Many other aspects of Socratic religion¹⁴⁹ could also be examined from a perspective not limited to Plato, as the works of Michael Erler¹⁵⁰ and Anthony Long¹⁵¹ demonstrate.

The need for such an approach is urgent even when dealing with Socrates' trial and death. Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, who wrote on this issue their first work¹⁵², have edited a source book which broadens the picture beyond Plato¹⁵³. One of the last articles by Hartmut Erbse, in which the evidence of Plato's and Xenophon's *Apologies* is studied carefully, also

Brickhouse–N.D. Smith (“Socrates’ *Daimonion* and Rationality”, 43-62), P. Destrée (“The *Daimonion* and the Philosophical Mission – Should the Divine Sign Remain Unique to Socrates?”, 63-79), R. Weiss (“For Whom the *Daimonion* Tolls”, 81-96), M. Joyal (“*To Daimonion* and the Socratic Problem”, 97-112), M. Narcy (“Socrates Sentenced by His *Daimōn*”, 111-125), L.-A. Dorion (“The *Daimonion* and the *Megalēgoria* of Socrates in Xenophon’s *Apology*”, 109-128), A. Brancacci (“The Double *Daimōn* in Euclides the Socratic”, 143-154).

¹⁴⁸ See M.L. McPherran, *The Religion of Socrates*, University Park PA 1996; “Recognizing the Gods of Socrates”, in Id. (ed.), *Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue. New Essays in Socratic Studies*, Edmonton 1996, 125-139; “Does Piety Pay? Socrates and Plato on Prayer and Sacrifice”, in N. D. Smith–P.B. Woodruff (eds.), *Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy*, New York 2000, 89-114.

¹⁴⁹ See e.g. G. Kloss, “Sokrates, ein Hahn für Asklepios und die Pflege der Seelen. Ein neuer Blick auf den Schluß von Platons *Phaidon*”, *Gymnasium* 108 (2001), 223-239; J. Doyle, “Socrates and the Oracle”, *Ancient Philosophy* 24 (2004), 19-36; J. Bussanich, “Socrates and Religious Experience”, in S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit., 200-213; J. Partridge, “Socrates’ *Daimonion* in Plato’s *Phaedrus*”, *Skepsis* 13-14 (2002-2003), 75-92, and “Socrates, Rationality, and the *Daimonion*”, *Ancient Philosophy* 28 (2008), 285-309.

¹⁵⁰ M. Erler, “Hilfe der Götter und Erkenntnis des Selbst. Sokrates als Göttergeschenk bei Platon und den Platonikern”, in T. Kobusch–M. Erler (eds.), *Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens*, München–Leipzig 2002, 387-414.

¹⁵¹ A.A. Long, “How Does Socrates’ Divine Sign Communicate With Him?”, in S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit., 63-74.

¹⁵² T.C. Brickhouse–N.D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial*, Oxford 1989.

¹⁵³ T.C. Brickhouse–N.D. Smith (eds.), *The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies*, New York–Oxford 2002.

moves in the same direction¹⁵⁴. Other recent work focuses on individual historical or philological details¹⁵⁵, or on the process as a whole¹⁵⁶.

2. A completely different way of handling the problem of Plato's Socrates is to look not at the context of the *Sōkratikoī logoi*, and not even that of the *corpus Platonicum*, but to each dialogue on its own. This approach has been practiced by Christopher Gill, who argues that every dialogue is «a dialectical and dramatic unit» providing «a specific dialectical encounter with its own integrity and significance»¹⁵⁷. According to Gill, dialectic is a «distinctively Platonic combination of an aspiration towards systematic, total understanding and a sense of the necessarily localized nature of any such aspiration»¹⁵⁸. Every dialogue is therefore a representation on its own of dialectic, arising each time in a different way from the specific arguments of its interlocutors. Hence the impossibility of reading Plato 'across' his writings: his corpus is in no way a 'system', but a whole formed by single unities.

3. In contrast to Gill's paradigm is the so-called 'unitarian' approach to Plato's Socrates. Charles Kahn is one of the major scholars subscribing to it, both in his book of 1996 and in a more recent article¹⁵⁹. Criticizing Vlastos's and the stylometrists's subdivision of the Platonic corpus into 'periods',

¹⁵⁴ H. Erbse, "Die Nachrichten von Anklage und Verteidigung des Sokrates", *Hermes* 132 (2004), 129-140.

¹⁵⁵ See J. Sullivan, "A Note on the Death of Socrates", *Classical Quarterly* 51 (2001), 608-610; C. Ungefehr-Kortus, "Die Geldstrafe in Platons *Apologie*", *Rheinisches Museum* 146 (2003), 279-290; M. Breitbach, "Der Prozess des Sokrates – Verteidigung der oder Anschlag auf die athenische Demokratie?", *Gymnasium* 112 (2005), 312-343.

¹⁵⁶ D. Nails, "The Trial and Death of Socrates", and R. Janko, "Socrates the Freethinker", both in S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit., 5-20 and 48-62 respectively. See as well P. Trawny, *Sokrates oder die Geburt der politischen Philosophie*, Würzburg 2007, esp. 16-25; E.R. Wilson, *The Death of Socrates*, Cambridge MA 2007; R. Waterfield, *Why Socrates Died*, New York 2009.

¹⁵⁷ C. Gill, "Dialectic and the Dialogue Form", in J. Annas–C. Rowe (eds.), *New Perspectives on Plato*, cit., 145-171; spec. 145-146. See as well "The Platonic Dialogue", in M.L. Gill–P. Pellegrin (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, cit., 136-150.

¹⁵⁸ C. Gill, "Dialectic and the Dialogue Form", cit., 153.

¹⁵⁹ See C. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, cit., and "On Platonic Chronology", in J. Annas–C. Rowe (eds.), *New Perspectives on Plato*, cit., 93-127.

Kahn claims that all we find in the dialogues is a literary construction in which the author (Plato) maintains his own views in letting them be expounded by his main character (Socrates). This entails that there is no ‘Socratic’ period in Plato, the ‘Socrates’ we know from the dialogues being a creation of Plato and not the reflection of a historical person. Hence Kahn’s major claim that only in the works of Plato, and in no other author, can we discover what is interesting about Socrates¹⁶⁰.

Kahn’s unitarian view has been followed by numerous scholars¹⁶¹, who have adhered to it while at the same time distancing themselves from Vlastos. One of these is William Prior¹⁶², whose criticism is directed mainly against Vlastos’ claim that Socrates is simply a moral philosopher. Referring back to Reginald Allen’s book of 1970¹⁶³, Prior argues that a metaphysical theory of forms can already be found in the elenctic dialogues. Hence the impossibility of differentiating a Socrates^E from a Socrates^M, or even of maintaining a ‘development’ in Plato’s dialogues¹⁶⁴.

An interesting position is also maintained by Holger Thesleff, a scholar renowned for his studies on Platonic chronology. In his recently republished collection of essays he points out that Plato’s dialogues show the style of a single author, and that they can be dated through stylometric analysis¹⁶⁵. This classification of styles is, however, vague, and can «only indicate tendencies», as Plato «constantly and deliberately changes his style from passage to passage and from work to work»¹⁶⁶ in order to provide a full characterization

¹⁶⁰ See esp. C. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, cit., 88-95.

¹⁶¹ For instance R. Ferber, “Was und wie hat Sokrates gewusst?”, *Elenchos* 28 (2007), 5-39 (= “What Did Socrates Know and How Did He Know It?”, in M. Erler–L. Brisson, eds., *Gorgias–Menon*, cit., 263-267).

¹⁶² W.J. Prior, “Socrates Metaphysician”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 27 (2004), 1-14; “The Socratic Problem”, in H.H. Benson (ed.), *A Companion to Plato*, cit., 25-35.

¹⁶³ R.E. Allen, *Plato’s Euthyphro and Earlier Theory of Forms*, London 1970.

¹⁶⁴ A view critical towards the developmentalist interpretations of Plato’s theory of Ideas is also that maintained by F. Fronterotta, “The Development of Plato’s Theory of Ideas and the ‘Socratic Question’”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 32 (2007), 37-62. Of the same author see as well “Socrate e il Platone esoterico”, and his review of *Xénophon. Mémoires*, ed. L.-A. Dorion, both *Elenchos*, 21 (2000), 79-87 and 22 (2001), 156-159 respectively.

¹⁶⁵ H. Thesleff, *Platonic Patterns. A Collection of Studies*, Las Vegas NV 2009. Not included in this collection is “Intertextual Relation between Xenophon and Plato?”, *Arctos* 36 (2002), 143-157.

¹⁶⁶ H. Thesleff, *Platonic Patterns*, cit., 141.

of the interlocutors. So «little or nothing can be said with certainty about the relative and absolute chronology of the ‘early’, ‘middle’, and ‘semi-authentic’ dialogues»¹⁶⁷. Thesleff maintains that there is no ‘development’ in Plato (from elenchus to ontology, or from a ‘Socratic’ to a ‘mature’ phase), but a series of different views and doctrines which arose from thought experiments discussed within his school. The dialogues are the result of this communal work-in-progress – of its successes as well as its failures.

4. An anti-developmental and unitarian view of Plato’s dialogues is also held by Christopher Rowe¹⁶⁸, whose standpoint is however very different from that of Kahn. Rowe believes (1) that Plato was a Socratic throughout his life¹⁶⁹, and (2) that it is therefore impossible to make out a clear distinction between a ‘Socratic’ and a ‘Platonic’ period in his works. With his first claim Rowe reverses Kahn’s account of a fictional Socrates, as in his view it is not Plato who ‘creates’ Socrates, but it is on the contrary the latter who influences everything Plato writes; with the second he criticizes Vlastos’ developmentalism, once again reversing Kahn’s position¹⁷⁰. Rowe also casts serious

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 399.

¹⁶⁸ See C. Rowe, “Socrates and Plato: An Introduction”, in C. Rowe–M. Schofield (eds.), *Greek and Roman Political Thought*, Cambridge Histories Online 2005, http://histories.cambridge.org/extract?id=chol9780521481366_CHOL9780521481366A010; “Just How Socratic Are Plato’s ‘Socratic’ Dialogues?” and C. Kahn, “Response to Christopher Rowe”, both *Plato. The Electronic Journal of the International Plato Society* 2 (2002), <http://www.nd.edu/~plato/plato2issue/contents2.htm>; “Socrates in Plato’s Dialogues”, in S. Ahbel-Rappe–R. Kamtekar (eds.), *A Companion to Socrates*, cit., 159-170.

¹⁶⁹ See C. Rowe, “Interpreting Plato”, in H.H. Benson (ed.), *A Companion to Plato*, cit., 13-24; esp. 23: «in essence... Plato remains a Socratic throughout... The identification of an early, ‘Socratic’, period, and a supposedly more realistic and analytical late one might be seen just as an appropriate modern refinement on a crudely unitarian – and insufficiently analytical – Neoplatonic approach. Yet this modern view is, and always has been, vulnerable, for the reasons I have suggested; among them are the ambiguities of the results reached by the stylometrists (the ‘middle’ dialogues are *not* a stylistically unitary group), and the continuing unclarity about exactly what gains are made, what gains Plato thought were made, and what really is changed, by the introduction of (what used to be called) ‘middle-period’ Forms».

¹⁷⁰ On this point see C. Rowe, “Plato, Socrates, and Developmentalism”, in N. Reshotko (ed.), *Desire, Identity and Existence: Studies in Honour of T.M. Penner*, Kelowna 2003, 17-32.

doubts on Vlastos' claim of attributing a set of theses to the real Socrates, since the character of the dialogues cannot be separated from the historical person. According to Rowe, it is very difficult to differentiate «between saying what the theory is, or must have been, and saying that Socrates (the historical one, partly reflected in Plato) had it fully, or perhaps even nearly, in his grasp»¹⁷¹. This entails that in the Platonic corpus «there is no clear sign of the distinction [*sc.* we find in Vlastos between morality and prudence], whether in what some people call its 'Socratic' parts or in its 'Platonic' parts»¹⁷².

The enormous influence exerted by Socrates on Plato is acknowledged also by the authors of the *Platon-Handbuch*¹⁷³. According to them, within the dialogues it is impossible to differentiate between what is 'Socratic' and what is 'Platonic', or even to separate elenctic examination from doctrinal teaching¹⁷⁴. Disentangling Plato from his 'Socratic masks'¹⁷⁵ is therefore an operation that makes no sense, and one which can lead only to unproductive results.

5. A much debated point deals with the fictional character of the *Sōkkratikoí logoi*. Some scholars claim that we should set aside in a bracket the problem of the historical Socrates and concentrate instead on the theoretical issues arising from the different portrayals of the philosopher from Antiquity to the present. Such a way of handling the 'Socratic question' can be found

¹⁷¹ C. Rowe, "Comments on Penner", in J. Annas–C. Rowe (eds.), *New Perspectives on Plato*, cit., 213-225, esp. 223.

¹⁷² C. Rowe, "Socrates and Plato on Virtue and the Good: an Analytical Approach", in G. Reale–S. Scolnicov (eds.), *New Images of Plato. Dialogues on the Idea of the Good*, Sankt Augustin 2002, 253-264, esp. 259. In another essay Rowe points out that this very distinction lacks also in other issues, such as the theory of forms: "What Difference Do Forms Make for Platonic Epistemology?", in C. Gill, *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity*, Oxford 2005, 215-232. On this issue see as well C. Rowe, *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing*, Cambridge 2007, esp. 1-51.

¹⁷³ C. Horn–J. Müller–J. Söder, 'Sokrates', cit.

¹⁷⁴ See as well N. Blöbner, "Sokrates und sein Glück, oder: weshalb hat Platon den *Phaidon* geschrieben?", in A. Havlicek–F. Karfík (eds.), *Plato's Phaedo. Proceedings of the Second Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, Praha 2001, 2-45.

¹⁷⁵ See A.N. Michelini, "Plato's Socratic Mask", in Id. (ed.), *Plato as Author. The Rhetoric of Philosophy*, Leiden–Boston 2003; esp. 45-65.

not only in contemporary scholarly literature¹⁷⁶, but also in works of scholars reaching from the second half of the Twentieth Century up to our time, such as Mario Montuori, Andreas Patzer, and Gernot Böhme¹⁷⁷.

6. Another recent approach, whose potentialities are yet to be investigated, concerns the hypothesis that philosophy established thanks to Plato and his companions because they were the first intellectuals in Antiquity to produce writings bearing an explicit philosophical character, thus elaborating a whole set of well-structured and realistic portrayals of philosophy and the sample-philosopher Socrates. This idea of philosophy took shape thanks to an intensive and creative production of texts written in dialogue form in a period of time reaching from about 399 to 350 B.C. The opening chapter of the present book addresses this issue, which promises to be very interesting, as it entails that Socrates, Plato and his companions were involved in the birth of Western philosophy altogether.

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Let us turn now to the papers collected in this book. All of them follow the general plan of the *Socratica* sessions, which is to re-think the relations between Socrates and his companions from the holistic viewpoint of ancient Socratic Literature. This is done from different perspectives. The first group of essays deals with the texts of the ‘first generation’ of Socratics, the second with Plato, the third with the latest Socratic, Xenophon. A fourth group is

¹⁷⁶ This standpoint is well expressed by William Calder when he states: «The search for the historical Socrates – Socrates the man – is... of less utility and value than the exploration of the idea of Socrates. This is not to say that the man was of no importance; on the contrary, as an historical individual he was of supreme importance. But it is the image of Socrates, not the ‘real’ Socrates, which has held a peculiar and unbroken fascination for the West from antiquity to the present» (*The Unknown Socrates*, cit., x). See also M. Trapp (ed.), *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, cit., xix, who names V. Gray, R. Rutherford, C. Rowe, and T. Brickhouse–N.D. Smith. Another scholar who avoids dwelling on the historical Socrates, concentrating instead on the *influence* this figure exerted on Plato and Xenophon, is David Sedley: see his “Socrates’ Place in the History of Teleology”, cit., 318.

¹⁷⁷ M. Montuori, *Socrate. Fisiologia di un mito*, Firenze 1971; A. Patzer, *Resignation vor dem historischen Sokrates*, in: Id. (ed.), *Apophoreta. Für Uvo Hölscher zum 60. Geburtstag*, Bonn 1975, 145-156; G. Böhme, *Der Typ Sokrates*, Frankfurt a.M. 1988.

dedicated to three important sample-cases of Socrates' *Nachleben* in Antiquity: the school of Epicurus, Philodemus, and Diogenes Laertius.

I. The First Generation

Four essays focus on the first generation of Socratics. As said, Livio Rossetti addresses a much discussed topic in Ancient Philosophy, the birth, first uses and eventual success of the nouns 'philosophy' and 'philosopher'. These nouns do appear in the fifth century, but in very limited number (less than ten occurrences), whereas in the decades following 399 B.C. they are used frequently (346 occurrences in Plato, 87 in Isocrates, 18 in Xenophon). This suggests that the genesis of these nouns is linked with the flourishing of the Socratic dialogues, since in those years this particular literary genre held a position of dominance over other philosophical literature such as, for example, the treatises *Peri physeos*. According to Rossetti, the 'birth' of philosophy took place therefore at the time of and immediately after Socrates. The Socratics treated their master as a philosopher, considered themselves philosophers, and presumed to be considered philosophers. A very important feature of this new consciousness was the aporetic character of many of their dialogues, i.e., the care they took to avoid well-identified conclusions. So a salient characteristic of their philosophical dialogues is a tendency toward wisdom, not a full grasp of it.

Noburu Notomi, instead, analyzes the texts of these authors with a view to discovering the relation that links Socrates and the Socratics to the sophistic movement. Two points are examined in depth: the professional activity of teaching for fees, and the art of rhetoric and verbal argument. The survey includes also some passages of Plato and Xenophon, thus providing a broad base for the viewpoint of the Socratics: according to Notomi, the extant writings of Aristippus, Antisthenes, Aeschines and Euclides «show no clear indication of the distinction between sophists and philosophers», whereas in Plato such distinction plays a key role in a number of dialogues: the *Protagoras*, *Theaetetus*, *Hippias Major*, *Hippias Minor*, *Gorgias*, *Republic I*, *Euthydemus*, and *Sophist*. The distinction has a double function: that of criticizing «the professional sophists who claim to be philosophers and educators» and also «the other Socratics who do not clearly distinguish Socrates from the other teachers». Furthermore, it entails that Socrates was often

mistaken for a sophist (such as Protagoras), and that his thought was in a «direct intellectual continuity» with them. As Notomi shows, the common distinction between Socrates and the sophists is not a reliable one; therefore, without Plato's account of it «this picture of the history of philosophy would have been correct».

Aldo Brancacci gives a thorough account of a major Socratic of the first generation, Antisthenes, a figure of utmost importance for the understanding of the intellectual hierarchy of the Socratics in the years after 399. According to Brancacci, «immediately after Socrates' death Antisthenes was considered the most representative among the Socratics». Strongly influenced by his master, he developed research especially in the fields of ethics and dialectics, linking both of them with linguistics. From Diogenes Laertius we learn that Antisthenes wrote also about other issues, such as physiognomy, mythology, and rhetoric. An important indirect source for Antisthenes is Isocrates, who criticizes him boldly in his booklet *Against the Sophists*. The latter provides useful details on the lost work *Alētheia*, enabling us to reconstruct essential features of Antisthenes's thought. A seminal role is played by the juxtaposition between *doxa* and *eirōneia*, also to be found in Plato: five whole books were written by Antisthenes on the topic. Brancacci dwells extensively on the connection between Antisthenic *epistēmē* and language, showing both the differences from and analogies with Plato and Xenophon.

The last essay devoted to the Socratics of the first generation is that of Domingo Plácido, who focuses on another elder companion of Socrates, Aischines of Sphettus. The literary production of Aischines can be dated to the years 390-380 B.C., and it consists of a series of dialogues which have many features in common with those of Plato and Xenophon. Plácido focuses especially on the *Alcibiades* and the *Aspasia*, providing a broad reconstruction of the historical context to which these *logoi* refer. Very important is in this respect the *pamphlet* wrote by Lysias against Aischines, from which we learn more on the rhetorical activity of this Socratic. Diogenes Laertius reports that Socrates taught rhetoric together with his disciple Aischines (II 20), a fact that Plácido relates to the straitened economic circumstances of both. Very different was the life of an aristocrat like Plato, whose wealth allowed him to avoid teaching for money. Hence the economical background of the «contradictions of Socraticism»: the different ways of interpreting the master's teachings after 399 were profoundly influenced by the different social status of individual Socratics.

II. Plato

Four essays are dedicated to Plato. The first is by Louis-André Dorion, who points out a major difference between Plato's and Xenophon's portrayals of Socrates: autarchy is attributed to Socrates only by Xenophon, whereas this does not happen in Plato. There are a number of reasons for this difference: (1) Plato does not talk often about *autarkeia*; in the whole *corpus* we have only thirteen occurrences of the term; (2) Plato does not adhere to the ideal of *autarkeia* the way Xenophon does; (3) even the characters of Plato's dialogues do not attribute autarchy to Socrates; (4) the fact that Plato's Socrates is poor, and therefore always dependent on the help of his companions, does not match with autarchy; (5) absolute material autarchy is an ideal condition which can never be realized within the Athenian *polis*; (6) autarchy means self-sufficiency also in social matters, i.e., non-reliance on friends: and since Socrates has plenty of friends, he cannot be autarchic; (7) true autarchy can be achieved only by a god; and (8) not even at *Symp.* 219e-220d, a passage in which Plato attributes to Socrates both *enkrateia* and *karteria*, do we find any trace of autarchy: on the contrary, the whole dialogue shows that Socrates' *anthrōpinē sophia* is in no way self-sufficiency, but invariably pursuit of improvement. Hence the Dorion's surprising conclusion: while Xenophon's Socrates wants to make his companions autarchic from a material point of view, Plato's Socrates does exactly the contrary, as he sets out to make them understand that they cannot really be autarchic, since philosophy is a need which can never be fully satisfied, but requires to be always pursued anew.

The essay by Walter Omar Kohan dwells on the paradoxical features of the Platonic Socrates' conceptions of politics, education, and wisdom. This is done through an analysis of a series of passages showing that Socrates is keen to point out that he is the only one to practice 'genuine politics' (*Gorg.* 521d), while at the same time he claims that the *daimonion* always restrained him from practicing *any* politics (*Apol.* 31c-e). A similar situation applies to education: on the one hand Socrates says that he was never a teacher (33a), on the other he warns the citizens who have just condemned him that his disciples will continue plaguing them even after his death (39c-d). Last but not least, Socrates claims that he knows very little, and possibly nothing at all (e.g. 21b; 23a); nonetheless, he has to cope with the oracle's saying that he is the wisest of all men (20e-21a). How to explain such discrepancies? The

extant passages from ‘aporetic’ dialogues such as the *Meno*, the *Laches*, the *Lysis*, and the *Euthyphro* don’t solve the problem, since the claims of Socrates in these dialogues are so different that one should better speak of a plurality of Socrateses at work in them. Hence the conclusion of Kohan: since every attempt to reconcile these claims makes no sense, they should be better approached as manifestations of contradictions unavoidably attaching to that ‘powerful enigma’ which is Socrates.

Lidia Palumbo deals with one of the most difficult passages of *Alcibiades I*, 133a-c. Leaving aside the complex issues linked to its authenticity, she analyzes the passage step-by-step, dwelling extensively on lines b7-10. According to Palumbo, it is far from certain that, in this passage, the soul striving for self-knowledge needs to be reflected in *another* soul, as is generally held. In fact, the text is not explicit as to whether the reflection is taking place between two different souls or within the same soul. The latter option should, however, be preferred, since it is more appropriate both to the sense of the passage and to the general context of the dialogue, which is entirely devoted to the question of self-knowledge. The *autēi* of 133b7 should be understood literally, as a reference to the self of the soul similar to that occurring in *Theaetetus*. 189e4-190a7, for in the latter passage there is no doubt that the soul dialogues with itself. Hence the characteristic feature of the dialogue is not the presence of two interlocutors, but the intimacy of its structure; every dialogue is the result of a series of questions and answers. And, as two passages from the *Sophist* and the *Philebus* show (263e3-264b1 and 38e1-4 respectively), thought takes place within the ‘silence’ of the soul, for it is *always dialogic*, or, as Palumbo puts it, ‘externalized’ as part of a process leading to the consciousness of the self.

The next contribution is about the historical context which led Socrates to be condemned to death in 399 B.C. Gabriele Cornelli and André Leonardo Chevitaese tackle two distinct moments: the oligarchic coup which took place in Athens in 404, and the restoration of democracy one year later, in 403. In a passage of the *Seventh Letter* (324c-325a) Plato reports that initially Socrates had great hopes in the oligarchy of the Thirty, but then, disappointed by their ‘bad deeds’ (*kaka*), ended up rejecting their government and, eventually, politics altogether. Cornelli and Chevitaese dwell on the reasons for this initial proximity to the Thirty: (1) important members of the Socratics like Critias and Charmides had an active role in that oligarchy and were close relatives of Socrates’ major disciple, Plato; (2) the name of Socrates figures

in a list of citizens to whom the Thirty had granted the privilege of staying in Athens and maintaining their property, whereas the properties of their enemies were systematically confiscated; (3) a passage of Plato's *Seventh Letter* (325b-c) seems to imply that Socrates was close to the Thirty; (4) Aischines (*Tim.* I 173) openly accuses Socrates of being responsible for the education of 'one of those who overthrew democracy', that is Critias. According to Cornelli and Chevitarese this evidence is extremely useful for an understanding of the political reasons lying behind the trial of Socrates. Those who prosecuted him were the democratic opponents of the Thirty, that is 'those who suffered exile' during the tyranny, as Plato reports in the *Seventh Letter* (325b-c). The latter text is of particular interest, since Plato defends his master here against the accusation of impiety, but says not a word on the second accusation, that of corrupting the youth. According to Cornelli and Chevitarese, the reason for this silence is that the latter accusation was politically the stronger one, and therefore much more difficult to refute than the first one. Plato had no argument against the 'material evidence' underlying this accusation, that is, the involvement in tyranny of Socrates' pupils Alcibiades and Critias.

III. Xenophon

The two essays on Xenophon's Socrates featured in the volume each deal with the *Memorabilia*. Donald Morrison focuses on a problematic issue in the work, that of *sophia*. Xenophon provides at least two accounts of it: on one hand, he is at one with Plato in espousing an intellectualism and a doctrine of the unity of the virtues that reminds us of, e.g., the *Protagoras* and the *Euthydemus* (*Mem.* III 9.4-5); on the other hand, he openly contradicts Plato in maintaining that wisdom can be sometimes good and sometimes bad, if not altogether unknowable: e.g., wisdom can be harmful and lead to destruction, as in the cases of Daedalus and Palamedes (III 8; IV 2.33). Or it can involve unknowable circumstances, as in the commanding of an army or the ruling of a city, which need the help of the gods to be foreseen (I 1.6-9). However, Morrison claims, there are cases in the *Memorabilia* in which human wisdom does not depend on divine guidance (e.g., III 9.4; IV 5.6; IV 5.11; IV 8.11), the most important of these being those linked with 'what is legal and what not' (IV 6.4-6). In such cases an 'intellectualist' wisdom, i.e. a wisdom indi-

stinguishable from virtue (as featured in III 9.4-5), is indeed possible, thus making *sophia* a sufficient but not necessary condition for the possession of the other virtues.

Alessandro Stavru analyzes a difficult passage of the *Memorabilia*, III 10.1-8. Here Socrates is in conversation with two artists of his time, the famous painter Parrhasius and the sculptor Cleiton, whom some scholars have identified with the great Polyclitus. The conversations follow a parallel schema: first, Socrates deals with the ‘exterior’ features of these arts, i.e., with their ability to represent the bodies of men in different positions. Both Parrhasius and Cleiton understand his arguments. Then he moves on to the ‘hidden’ features of these same arts, i.e., to their capability to at the same time show forth the interior qualities of the subjects represented: in the case of painting this interior quality is *ēthos*, in that of sculpture *pathos*. This is barely understood by Socrates’ interlocutors, who eventually learn from him that the distinctive feature of their arts is the ‘appearance’ (*phainesthai*) they bring about, both of ‘what can be seen’ and ‘what cannot be seen’. Stavru’s main claim is that this *phainesthai* is hinting at the deceptive nature of Parrhasius’s and Cleiton’s craftsmanship, and that the whole issue discussed in III 10.1-8 should therefore be interpreted in relation to Fifth- and Fourth-Century illusionistic art. Hence the conclusion that in this passage Xenophon is making use of professional artists’ writings of his time, such as the *Canon* of Polyclitus, and is proffering a theoretical overview of them.

IV. *Nachleben*

Three essays shed light on the *Nachleben* of Socrates in Antiquity. Michael Erler dwells on the reception of Socratic *parrhēsia* within the Epicurean tradition. *Parrhēsia* is often translated with ‘frankness’. It entails a core value of democratic Athens, freedom of speech; at the same time, *parrhēsia* is in Plato the *conditio sine qua non* of Socratic elenchus, whose aim is to put to the test not only an argument occurring during a conversation, but also the person propounding that argument. There are, however, two major differences between traditional and Socratic *parrhēsia*, as Erler points out. The first concerns the asymmetrical nature of the Socratic dialogue, which is always between a master ‘who knows’ and a student ‘who doesn’t know’. The second is that very often Socrates does not speak frankly with his

interlocutors, but retains his knowledge and hides it behind irony (e.g., *Apol.* 40c; *Resp.* 337a). The *parrhēsia* of Plato's Socrates depends therefore on the intellectual level of his interlocutors. Absolute frankness is not always possible, and in some cases restriction of knowledge is even necessary in order to avoid misunderstandings (e.g. *Resp.* 533a). Very different from Plato's standpoint is that of Epicurus, who talks about himself as a philosopher committed to frankness under every circumstance. In his view and in that of his followers, truth should be taught in the clearest possible way to everyone. Thus *parrhēsia* plays a seminal role in the educational process of the Epicureans, being part as it is of a *philia* which should never be missing between master and student. We learn this from Philodemus' treatise *De libertate dicendi*, where the differences between Socratic and Epicurean *parrhēsia* are most evident.

The paper by Graziano Ranocchia also deals with a 'Socratic' topic addressed in the Philodemus papyri, and that is irony. The focus is on a passage contained in the treatise *De vitiis* (*PHerc.* 1008), where Philodemus cites Ariston's *De liberando a superbia*. Here a negative caricature of the 'ironic' type outlined in Plato's dialogues is provided, thereby posing the difficulty of reconciling this passage with other occurrences of irony in Philodemus (where the term does not have a negative meaning, e.g., in the *Rhetorica*, the *De morte*, and the *De pietate*). Ranocchia solves the difficulty maintaining that the argument of the *De superbia* should be attributed to the Stoic philosopher Ariston of Chios, and not to Philodemus. Indeed, in their reception of Socrates the Stoics had no sympathy with irony, nor with the ironical Socrates featured in Plato. Their Socrates was mainly dogmatic, and based on Xenophon rather than on Plato. The negative portrayal arising from this passage should therefore be understood as a polemical attack on an image of a 'sceptical' Socrates which is juxtaposed to the Stoic one: that featured by Ariston's contemporary Arcesilaus, the leader of the Platonic Academy.

The section on the *Nachleben* of Socrates in Antiquity is rounded off with an essay by Michel Narcy, which focuses on Diogenes Laertius' account of the relationship between Socrates and Euripides. Narcy concentrates on a comic fragment reported by Diogenes (II 18), from which one could receive the impression of a negative portrayal of Socrates. Narcy shows that this impression is wrong. For the fragment has to be attributed to a close relative of Euripides, Mnesilochos, and not to Telecleides, as most scholars maintain. In claiming that Socrates collaborated to the *Phryges*, Mnesilochos is setting

out to bestow noble status on Euripides' work, thus implicitly praising the quality of Socrates' contribution. This entails that the passage should not be interpreted in the traditional sense, i.e., as a document concerning the friendship of Socrates and Euripides, but as a way of drawing attention to the importance of Socrates in the eyes of his contemporaries. Narcy points out that here Diogenes does not say whether it is his own opinion that their collaboration took place, and in II 33 he even puts before us a Socrates openly criticizing Euripides' rehearsal of the *Augēs*. Hence Narcy's conclusion: unlike the allusions we can find in Old Comedy, Diogenes does not believe that Socrates collaborated with Euripides; on the contrary, through a sophisticated narrative strategy he refutes this commonplace, and demonstrates the intellectual superiority of Socrates.

In Memoriam

The volume ends with the paper which opened the *Socratica 2008* Symposium, Aniello Montano's commemoration of the great scholar Mario Montuori. This essay is particularly dear to the editors of the volume, since both were friends of Montuori. Montano, who was also a close friend of Montuori, provides a thorough account on the scholar's literary production. This was not limited to Socrates, as Montuori studied in depth a variety of authors and issues of different periods, devoting special attention to the edited and the non-edited *oeuvre* of John Locke. According to Montano, Montuori's work on Socrates follows two distinct paths: on the one hand, the 'myth' of Socrates, i.e., the reception of his *exemplum* from Antiquity to the present (Manetti, Fréret, Dresig, Garnier, Palissot, Schleiermacher); on the other hand, the study of the 'historical Socrates', i.e., the evaluation of the sources which do not fall within Olof Gigon's definition of 'Socratic poetry'. These are very limited, as in Montuori's view the sole reliable testimony is the text of the accusation. Hence every literary portrait of Socrates, including those of Plato and Xenophon, should be interpreted as Socratic 'myth', that is as an attempt to defend the master's memory from the accusations of 399. In Montuori's opinion, Socratic literature is therefore not historical but apologetic, and the sophisticated images of Socrates it features reflect not the master's theories, but the political and intellectual conditions within which the Socratics operated after his death.

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